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Abstract 
Board composition is critical to board effectiveness. A review of the literature 
suggests boards of directors need high levels of skills, knowledge and experience to 
fulfil their governance duties. However, less focus has been paid to the necessity for 
board members to interact and work together as a team. Director selection is 
fundamentally linked to board composition and therefore also critical to board 
effectiveness, yet the process of selecting directors is largely absent from the 
literature.  
This research is motivated by a need for greater understanding of how and why 
individuals are selected onto boards and the importance paid to board dynamics. 
This exploratory study involved in-depth interviews with current non-executive 
directors to identify what directors consider as important criteria when selecting 
new members and the process by which candidates are selected.  
The findings indicate that boards select new members based not only on their 
ability to contribute complementary skills and experience but also on a perceived 
compatibility with the incumbent board members. While these two selection 
criteria are considered equal in importance, not all selection approaches are able to 
adequately assess both criteria. As a result many selections fail to realise their 
selection criteria. This research categorises four common approaches to director 
selection and discusses the ability of each to meet the selection criteria.  
Collectively the findings are illustrated in a model that shows a relationship 
between the selection criteria, selection approach and selection outcome. It 
suggests a poor approach to selection may lead to the appointment of a misfit, 
which can have negative implications for board group dynamics. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Board composition has featured heavily in corporate governance research with 
many studies addressing the question of how should a board compose itself to most 
effectively carry out its role? While there is limited consensus on what types of 
people make the best directors (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2012), most agree that 
boards require a high level of skill, knowledge and expertise to fulfil their 
governance duties (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Forbes & Miliken, 
1999). There is also a general consensus that the level of an individual’s knowledge 
and experience has an impact on effective board functioning (Kula & Tatoglu, 2006; 
Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Subsequently a 
substantial body of corporate governance literature has considered how various 
forms of human and social capital can add value to a board (Haynes & Hillman, 
2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kim & Cannella, 2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
What is often absent from this conversation is the necessity for board members to 
interact and work together as a team (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2007; Sonnenfeld, 2002). This gap reflects the generally 
limited research into group dynamics within boards that Sonnenfeld (2002) 
described as “the missing ingredient” in board effectiveness research. 
Selecting a new director is fundamentally linked to board composition and 
therefore overall board effectiveness, yet this area has received little recent 
attention in the corporate governance literature (O’Neal, & Thomas, 1995; Withers, 
Hillman, & Cannella, 2012). Two well known early studies into boards of directors, 
Mace’s (1971) Directors: Myth & Reality and Lorsch & MacIver’s (1989) Pawns or 
Potentates are frequently relied on to describe an approach to director selection 
that is informal, reliant on existing relationships and dominated by the CEO. 
Decades have passed since these books were first published and much has changed 
within corporate governance practices. Widespread reporting of corporate scandals 
has seen increased attention paid to board functioning both by scholars and 
regulators and as a result boards are under increasing pressure to have well-
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defined recruitment processes in place. In Australia, corporate governance 
guidelines suggest a formal director selection approach by which candidates are 
identified and selected for their ability to enhance the boards’ capacity to govern 
effectively. At the same time researchers continue to point to informal practices 
and social influences over board appointments (Westphal, & Zajac, 1995; Westphal 
& Stern, 2006, 2007).  
Boards are very powerful and their decisions can have a significant impact on the 
organisation as well as the wider community, raising great interest in the inner 
workings of boards. Yet boards are also very difficult to observe and this has 
resulted in limited first-hand examinations of the processes that take place inside 
the boardroom. Instead, research into board composition has typically relied on 
second-hand archival data to describe recordable and countable characteristics of 
the individual directors who comprise a board. While this has advanced the general 
knowledge to some extent, it has also left a gap in our knowledge of board 
behaviour and in particular boardroom dynamics. This gap is reflected in the 
numerous calls by scholars for more behaviour-based research in board studies. 
The broad aim of this study is to address this limitation and contribute to the body 
of knowledge in corporate governance by gaining a deeper understanding of 
director selection including how and why directors are selected.  
1.2. Motivations 
Public expectations of directors have changed. Historically there has been 
scepticism over a board’s effectiveness, evident in a description by Mace who 
characterised boards as “nothing more and nothing less than the ornaments on the 
corporate Christmas tree” (1971, p. 90). Since then a string of highly publicised 
corporate scandals, including Enron and Worldcom in the US and National Australia 
Bank, James Hardie and Centro in Australia, has resulted in an unprecedented level 
of public scrutiny along with an increased interest into the role of the board of 
directors (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). 
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In the past, boards have been known for recruiting from the old boys club, cronyism 
and selecting in self-interest. Today, pressures for greater rigour and transparency 
are resulting in justification of director appointments by emphasising an individual’s 
skills, experience and qualifications. What is often missing is recognition that the 
board as a group must be able to cooperate and communicate in order to facilitate 
effective group decision making. The extent to which a board ‘gets along’ is 
therefore critical in selection decisions, yet it is often overlooked.   
This study is motivated by the absence of a clear and current understanding of 
director selection practices and a need for greater emphasis on the board as a 
group. Board dynamics are critical to board effectiveness and director selection is a 
fundamental stage in developing and maintaining a well-functioning board. 
1.3. Context 
This study is based on the experiences of Australian non-executive directors in 
selecting and being selected for new board appointments. It does so in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of the practices and variability that exist within 
director selection across multiple organisational settings.  
Director selection is an important yet relatively underexplored area of corporate 
governance. This chapter has already highlighted the increased focus that has been 
placed on corporate governance practices through much of the developed world. 
Within Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance Council was formed in 2002 to 
provide practical guidelines on corporate governance for listed Australian 
companies. It subsequently released a set of Principals and Recommendations the 
following year, which were amended in 2010. Over 2000 listed Australian 
companies have adopted these recommended practices including a ‘if not, why not’ 
reporting practice whereby guidelines not followed in practice are highlighted and 
explained in a company’s annual report (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). 
Specific to this study, Principle 2 describes best practices for structuring a board 
including the process by which new directors are selected and appointed. The result 
has meant more information than ever before is being reported by publicly listed 
sector companies regarding their corporate governance practices and in particular 
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the process followed for new director appointments. At the same time, boards are 
facing many new challenges in attracting new directors due to increased legal 
scrutiny and changing director liabilities (Warry & Guthrie, 2013).  
Most media and regulatory focus on corporate governance and director selection 
practices within Australia has centred on the listed corporate sector. Similarly 
empirical studies in the area of corporate governance typically draw data from a 
single organisational setting and most often from publically listed companies. This 
study departs from this tradition, and draws insight from a broader organisational 
context. Sample data includes publicly listed, non-profit and government sector 
organisations across a range of sizes and industries.  
1.4. Purpose and research questions 
Studies into board composition are abundant; Johnson et al. (2012) identify over 
300 studies into board characteristics between 1990 and 2011. Surprisingly few, 
however, have considered the antecedent to board composition – how directors 
are identified and appointed. This gap is in part attributed to the ‘black-box’ of 
board research that refers to the difficulty in accessing boards and directors (Daily, 
Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). As a result, while we know much about who sits on a 
board we know little of why and how they were selected. Since the selection of a 
new director plays a fundamental role in board effectiveness this area deserves 
greater examination.  
Given the lack of existing empirical research into the director selection this study 
has been designed to explore the experiences and perceptions of individuals who 
have been involved in selecting new directors. In doing so this research intends to 
understand how selections in practice vary from the prescribed process for 
selection. The research aims to provide insight into the variances and similarities 
that exist in processes and criteria for selection.   
What has been deemed important to this study are the experiences of the 
individuals and therefore qualitative methods have been used to derive meaning 
from their recounted experiences of director selection. 
5 
 
The purpose of this study is to develop a greater understanding of the criteria and 
approach for selecting non-executive directors across Australian publicly listed, 
non-profit and government sector organisations. Specifically this research focuses 
on two important elements of the selection process, identifying candidates and the 
selection decision.  
This study has been designed around two important research questions: 
1. What criteria are considered important in selecting candidates? 
This exploratory question is designed to provide an understanding of what 
boards look for when identifying and selecting new members and which 
criteria are perceived to be the most important.  
 
2. How are directors selected? 
This question is designed to provide an understanding of what process 
boards adopt to identify and select new directors. This question endeavours 
to gain an understanding of the variances that exist in approaches to 
selection in terms of the source for identifying candidates and involvement 
in the selection decision. 
 
The inductive nature of this exploratory study led to a further research question 
being added during the data analysis process,  
 
3. How does the selection approach impact a board’s ability to meet its 
selection criteria?  
This research question explores the findings from Research question 2 and 
considers how each approach to director selection impacts the board’s 
ability to test for the criteria, considered important in Research Question 1, 
and thereby deliver a successful selection outcome. 
 
6 
 
1.5. Significance 
There are conflicting perceptions of director selection. Empirical research suggests 
an informal process heavily influenced by personal networks and dominated by 
CEOs acting in self-interest (e.g. Lorsch & MacIver, 1989, Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
This is at odds with agency theory that dominates the corporate governance 
literature and assumes directors are selected for their ability to monitor 
management thereby protecting the shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Alongside the scholarly literature are the prescribed best practices which advocate 
a formal and uniform approach to director selection including a wide search for 
candidates that meet the boards desired attributes and agreement from all board 
members on the successful candidate (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010; 
Moodie, 2001). This imbalance between research, theory and assumed practice 
suggests a need for further investigation to provide a clear and current view of 
actual director selection processes. 
This study addresses this need and in doing so expands our understanding of 
current selection practices. The findings show that while many of the traditional 
and informal practices continue, there has been a significant shift toward a more 
rigorous approach to director selection. Furthermore, this study provides evidence 
of a greater awareness of what boards need to govern effectively. This is reflected 
in their expressed desire for candidates who ‘fit in’, where fit is measured both in 
terms of technical skills and experience as well as by perceived compatibility with 
existing board members. 
This research contributes toward a greater understanding of board behavioural 
processes by providing current empirical evidence of how Australian organisations 
select directors. Given the importance of director selection toward the overall 
effectiveness of the board, this study is important for many reasons. From a 
theoretical viewpoint this study contributes to the development of corporate 
governance through an increased understanding of how directors are selected, an 
area that has been acknowledged as incomplete in the corporate governance 
literature (Withers et al., 2012). In doing so this study also addresses calls for more 
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research into what boards do (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005) and calls for a 
greater focus on the human aspects of board behaviour (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Sonnenfeld, 2002). The knowledge gained through this study will form a basis for 
future studies into board performance. Additionally the findings from this study will 
inform future research aimed at understanding the impact of director selections on 
a number of performance-related variables including diversity and group dynamics.  
In regard to contributions to practice this study extends the knowledge of board 
recruitment practices beyond those disclosed by publicly listed companies to 
include non-profit and government sector organisations. It provides empirical 
evidence of a wide variation in director selection practices adopted by 
organisations within Australia and highlights where adopted practices are likely to 
have negative consequences on board dynamics.   
1.6. Organisation of the thesis 
This chapter has introduced the need for more research into board behaviour and a 
lack of current empirical research examining director selection practices. It has 
described that the purpose of this study is to address these limitations by gaining a 
greater understanding of director selection in Australia, and introduced two 
important research questions. 
Chapter 2 provides background to the research problem and reviews the existing 
corporate governance literature relevant to each of the two research questions. 
Chapter 3 describes the qualitative research design adopted for this research and 
provides a rationale for adopting this method describing a methodological fit. This 
chapter provides details of the process for data collection and analysis of the data 
to derive the results. 
Chapter 4 presents and describes the findings from research questions one and two 
and also raises a further important research question that is consequently explored 
through another round of iteration between the theory and data.  
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Chapter 5 brings together the outcomes from Chapter 4 to present the key findings 
and contributions of this study. This chapter also addresses the limitations to this 
study, the research implications and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
Board composition has featured heavily in corporate governance research with 
many studies addressing the question ‘how should a board compose itself to most 
effectively carry out its role?’ These studies have focused largely on the size and 
structure of the board and the profile of individual directors. Increasingly board 
effectiveness is viewed as a combination of the collective skills and knowledge that 
a board has at its disposal as well as the group’s ability to interact and work 
together as a team (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 
2007; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Yet there is limited research on the second component – 
group dynamics within boards (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). This has 
prompted calls for greater attention to the ‘human-side’ of corporate governance, 
described by Sonnenfeld (2002) as “the missing ingredient” in attempts to 
understand how to make boards more effective. 
Integral to board composition is director selection. While the topic of board 
composition has been extensively studied (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010) 
the actual process of selecting a new director has received little attention in the 
corporate governance literature (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995; Withers et al., 2012). The 
result is that while we know who sits on a board we know little of how or why they 
were selected. 
This chapter is organised into two parts. Firstly, I provide a background to this study 
by reviewing the corporate governance literature on board effectiveness as well as 
an overview of the literature on effective decision-making in small groups. This 
literature provides context for the research questions. Secondly, I review the 
literature on the director selection that addresses the first two research questions, 
what criteria is important in director selections and how are directors selected. 
While the context for this study is Australian publicly listed, government and non-
profit organisations, a majority of the corporate governance literature discussed 
within this chapter is based on non-Australian studies of public corporations and 
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largely set in North America and Europe for which there is a similar corporate 
governance environment. As such this literature is considered relevant to this 
study. One notable difference between Australian and North American governance 
practices is the dual role of the CEO and Chair. In the US 71% of large companies are 
led by CEOs who also act also as the Chair of the board whereas in Australia this is 
26% (Monem, 2013).  
2.2. Background: Framing the Research Problem  
2.2.1. Board Effectiveness 
Board effectiveness has become an important area of research in corporate 
governance. The increase in frequency and impact of reported corporate scandals 
in particular has led many to consider the question of how to ensure board 
effectiveness (Huse, 2005).  
In response a large body of research has sought to measure board effectiveness by 
comparing changes in board structure, such as size and composition, to changes in 
organisational performance. This traditional approach has been found to produce 
inconclusive results (Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991, 2003) with 
critics citing two related weaknesses. Firstly these studies undertaken from an 
economic perspective are driven by a reliance on agency theory and as such tend to 
focus on a single board role – monitoring. Secondly, through a reliance on 
secondary data, they fail to take account of the complexity of the relationships and 
processes that exist within a board (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2007; Huse, 
Hoskisson, Zattoni, & Vigano, 2011; Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012; Van 
Ees, Gabrielesson, & Huse, 2009). 
For decade’s board studies have emphasised monitoring as a primary task of the 
board (Bonn & Pettigrew, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Mace, 1971). 
Agency theory asserts that a board composed of independent directors will be 
more effective in their monitoring task and that this will lead to greater firm 
performance and increased investor appreciation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993; Thain & Leighton, 1995). However, support for a positive relationship 
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between independence and firm performance has been found to be inconclusive 
(Adams et al., 2010; Blair & Stout, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Furthermore, 
while there is general consensus that monitoring is a role assigned to boards, 
scholars have also acknowledged the board is assigned other roles, including 
strategy and resource provision (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hung, 1998; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). Others have emphasised the role of the board as a decision-making 
group (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Van Ees et al. point out 
that boards may be “less concerned with solving problems of conflicts than with 
solving problems of coordination and strategic decision making” (2009, p. 308).  
Consequently some scholars have criticised the dominance of agency theory and 
therefore independence as the sole criteria for evaluating board performance, 
suggesting there is a need to move away from agency theory in order to achieve 
new perspectives in board research (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011; Minchilli, 
Zattoni, & Zona, 2009; Zingales, 2000). However, Huse et al. (2011) point out this 
need not be an abandonment of agency theory but rather a balancing of it with 
perspectives from other theories and disciplines.  
A second criticism of traditional studies into board composition is aimed at the 
method of investigation rather than the theory. This criticism stems from a reliance 
on the growing supply of archival information in an attempt to establish a 
relationship between the financial performance of an organisation and “the usual 
suspects” (Finkelstein & Mooney (2003, p. 101), where the usual suspects refer to 
typical measures of board independence including the number of board members, 
CEO duality, insider/outsider ratio and director stock holdings.  
There is growing support for an alternative approach that recognises board 
dynamics as an important component of board performance (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). 
Under this approach boards are recognised as decision-making groups susceptible 
to the social-psychological processes that foster and inhibit effective decision-
making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Milliken & Vollrath, 1991). The large 
volume of these ‘input-output’ studies (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004) appear to 
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incorporate the interactions and relationships between directors (Daily et al., 2003; 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Pettigrew, 1992; Roberts et al., 
2005; Van Ees et al., 2009). This has led reviews of the literature to conclude that 
the traditional approach of measuring board effectiveness through board 
performance and through board composition characteristics is inconclusive and 
unreliable (Adams et al., 2010; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). 
To counter these deficiencies, scholars have called for a new behavioural-based 
approach to board studies that incorporate processes and relational dynamics in 
and around the boardroom (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992) and to 
utilise new perspectives and theories from other disciplines (Huse et al., 2011). In 
response, a series of board behavioural studies have emerged that focus on these 
intervening variables between board composition and organisational performance 
(e.g. Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; 
Neill & Dulewicz, 2010; Westphal, 1998, 1999). Similarly a stream of behavioural 
research centres on power and relationships in and around the boardroom (e.g. Ng 
& Cock, 2002; Stewart, 1991; Stiles, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
Scholars following the behavioural approach have identified a different set of 
director and board characteristics that differ from the usual suspects. Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) suggest three attributes of the group – effort norms, cognitive 
conflict and the use of skills and knowledge – may influence the ability of boards to 
perform their control and service tasks. Emerging evidence suggests these three 
processes have a greater influence on board task performance than traditional 
demographic variables (Minichilli et al., 2009, 2012). Other scholars continue to 
investigate these and similar processes. For instance, Huse (2005, 2007) identified 
cohesiveness, commitment, creativity and criticality as components of decision-
making culture that impact board task performance.  
Despite the recognition that understanding board behaviour is an important factor 
in understanding board effectiveness, it remains a relatively undeveloped area of 
corporate governance research (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Huse et al., 2011). In 
part this has been attributed to the difficulty in gaining access to process-orientated 
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data on boards (Daily et al., 2003) that has come to be known as a ‘black box’ 
(Roberts et al., 2005). 
This study aims to contribute to the new research agenda on board behaviour by 
offering a new understanding into how and why directors are selected through a 
qualitative examination. In particular this study is interested in whether directors 
are selected on visible attributes such as their functional backgrounds and 
experience, or whether selection decisions are influenced by less visible 
behavioural attributes such as cohesion and established relationships. In doing so 
this study aligns with work by previous scholars (e.g. Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 
2005, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2012; Van Ees et al., 2009) who have adopted 
behavioural approaches to studying boards, complementing the existing body of 
knowledge and contributing toward the opening of the ‘black box’ of board 
research.  
2.2.2. The Board as a Decision Making Group 
Behavioural research suggests that in many situations group decision-making is 
superior to that of individuals. Groups outperform individuals when required to 
exercise evaluative judgement (Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1984; Miner, 1984) and in 
complex problem solving (Husband, 1940; Shaw, 1932; Watson & Michaelsen, 
1988); both activities are critical to the board’s role. Viewing the board as a decision 
making group supports the legal power granted to a board of directors (Bainbridge, 
2002; Baxt, 2009) as the apex of corporate decision-making. Thus, the legal position 
reinforces these findings from psychology surrounding complex decision making, 
best summed up by Forbes and Milliken (1999, p. 490), “[t]he very existence of the 
board as an institution is rooted in the wise belief that the effective oversight of an 
organisation exceeds the capabilities of any individual and that collective knowledge 
and deliberation are better suited to this task”.  
While the capabilities of a group are often assumed to exceed those of the 
individuals that comprise it, a constant challenge for groups such as boards is 
ensuring they can harness that collective knowledge in order to reach the groups 
full potential. The mere presence of skills and knowledge in a boardroom does not 
14 
 
ensure they will be used (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), nor can it be assumed they will 
be used in value creation (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). 
The unique characteristics of boards 
While boards can be viewed as groups, they have many other unique characteristics 
that may not be shared with groups in traditional management research. These 
differences also create challenges to the effective fulfilment of the board’s role. 
Boards meet infrequently and episodically, meeting on average 10 – 12 times a year 
or the equivalent of two weeks per year (Leblanc, 2004). They often consist of 
independent outside directors who rarely work together and who hold other full 
time jobs and/or a number of other directorships (Adams et al., 2010; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003). Additionally boards are typically comprised of individuals from 
diverse areas of expertise (Monks & Minow, 2011) and although they are tasked 
with the monitoring and influencing of strategy they are not involved in its 
implementation nor are they involved in the day to day administration of the 
organisation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Consequently they are busy individuals with 
limited direct exposure to the organisations’ operations (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
Furthermore, unlike other work groups, directors do not hold any formal power as 
individuals; formal power rests with the board acting as a group (Bainbridge, 2002; 
Baxt, 2009). In contrast to other organisational workgroups, there is no formal 
hierarchy in a board and so disruptions to the decision making process threaten the 
exercise of power within the organisation at the highest level. Finally, decisions 
made by a board have the potential to have a significant impact on the organisation 
and potentially the wider community (Golden & Zajac, 2001).  
While these features distinguish boards from many other organisational groups, 
boards nevertheless share many of the features that define a group. Boards have 
rules (both formal and informal) and relatively stable memberships; they are 
identifiable as a group and engage in common tasks that require interaction and 
joint decisions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
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Where board dynamics have been studied, director relationships between 
members of the board have been found to be a crucial variable in board 
effectiveness (James & Letendre, 2003), More specifically, poor team relationships 
are a significant cause for process loss in boards (Neill & Dulewicz, 2010). These 
findings are supported by other studies on board dynamics that have suggested 
trust and respect between members is highly correlated with group effectiveness 
(Murphy & McIntyre, 2007; Sonnenfeld, 2002). From a normative perspective, the 
view from governance expert Adrian Cadbury (2002) is typical, “openness between 
board members is not only fundamental to the working of an effective board, it also 
sets the tone for relationships throughout the company” (p. 88). 
Despite the limited empirical studies that examine board relationships (Letendre, 
2004), there is a general consensus amongst scholars and governance experts that 
open discussion and positive team relationships are important inputs to board 
performance. What follows is a review of the factors that facilitate these positive 
boardroom dynamics and a consideration of the common problems faced by 
decision-making groups. 
2.2.3. Board Group Dynamics 
This section of the literature review draws from the literature on small groups and 
research from corporate governance to consider three factors commonly discussed 
in relation to group effectiveness; cohesion, trust and cognitive conflict. Along with 
this it considers the problems that groups in general and boards in particular face in 
reaching their objectives. While research suggests groups outperform individuals in 
many decision making scenarios, factors including process loss, relationship conflict 
and group think can interfere with the decision making process. 
Group cohesiveness 
Group cohesiveness refers to the extent to which members of a group are attracted 
to each other (Summers, Coffelt, & Horton, 1988). In turn, when group members 
are attracted to each other, they communicate more frequently in a positive 
manner (Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1992; Shaw, 1981). Thus cohesion has been shown 
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to increase cooperation (Back, 1951; Shaw & Shaw, 1962); realise higher levels of 
member satisfaction (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Summers et al., 1988) and result in a 
greater commitment to the group (Zaccaro & Dobbins, 1989; Bettenhausen, 1991). 
Furthermore members of a cohesive group are more motivated to advance the 
group’s objectives (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). While evidence of a relationship 
between group cohesion and group performance is mixed, more studies support a 
positive relationship (Carron, 1988; Evans & Dion, 1991, 2012; Mullen & Cooper, 
1994). 
Effective group decision making requires time and effort by group members in 
gathering, discussing and interpreting information, and therefore the level of effort 
group members expend in decision tasks impacts the quality of the decision 
(Hirokawa & Rost, 1992). For boards, a high level of cohesiveness may lead to 
increased interaction and sharing of knowledge, increased trust and an increase in 
the effort directors invest in their role (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; O’Reilly & 
Chatman, 1986). Similarly, a high level of cohesion between directors can increase 
board-level effort norms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Kim & Cannella, 2008; Steiner, 
1972). Members of a cohesive group are more concerned with how they are 
perceived by other members of the group and are therefore less likely to simply ‘go 
through the motions’ but instead will be encouraged to invest greater cognitive 
effort in their tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Thus cohesion is important to a 
board’s overall ability to function as a team and perform their governance duties 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Khurana & Pick, 2004; Langevoort, 2001; Olson & Adams, 
2004). 
Trust 
Trust alleviates the fear that another person will act opportunistically (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989) and therefore promotes openness and increases communication flow. 
By contrast a lack of trust interferes with group productivity (Langevoort, 2001). If a 
person is not trusted their input will also not be trusted, creating more complicated 
and prolonged debate. Trust therefore saves time by increasing the perceived 
reliability of the other person’s information (Arrow, 1974; Gibb, 1978).   
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For boards, trust is critical in facilitating the exchange of information between 
board members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2007; Langevoort, 2001; Offstein, 
Gnyawali, & Cobb, 2005). Trust between directors encourages different points of 
view by breaking down the barriers that may otherwise inhibit members from 
speaking up and expressing their opinions (Kanter, 1977; Naphiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Sonnenfeld, 2002). This is especially important for new board members who may 
otherwise not feel comfortable contributing to discussion early in their tenure 
resulting in decisions being made without the full participation of the board 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003).  
Cognitive conflict 
Cognitive conflict, also described as task conflict, arises from a difference in opinion 
and viewpoint and has been linked to better-quality group discussion through open 
and candid dialogue (Baron, 1991; Simons & Peterson, 2000). The relationship 
between task conflict and group performance is complex. Although it has been 
subject to a number of studies, results are varied and inconclusive, suggesting its 
influence is dependent on a number of other variables such as the type of group 
task and the presence of other types of conflict such as relationship conflict 
(DeDreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit, 2012).   
For boards, some cognitive conflict has been considered beneficial to the strategic 
decision making process by stimulating productive debate thereby encouraging 
more alternatives and better evaluation of alternatives (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; 
Letendre, 2004).  
Trust within a group has been noted as being critical to gaining the benefits of 
cognitive conflict and that without intra-group trust task conflict could be 
misinterpreted negatively as relationship conflict (Simons & Peterson, 2000). This 
outcome was observed in directors by Mace (1971) who found some board 
members responded to cognitive conflict by withdrawing from the discussion and 
reducing their commitment.  
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Process loss 
Research into small groups has indicated that the mere presence of skills and 
knowledge does not guarantee their use. If groups are unable to interact and 
communicate effectively they risk significant process loss reducing the capacity to 
draw from the accumulated knowledge at their disposal (Steiner, 1972). A small 
group that suffers interaction difficulties will not fully tap into its resources and 
therefore fail to reach its full potential due to ‘process losses’. Process losses come 
from misunderstandings, miscommunication and dislike between group members 
which waste group energy, increasing the gap between actual and potential 
performance (Steiner, 1972). In a UK qualitative study examining board 
relationships, Neill and Dulewicz (2010) found the quality of team relationships is 
the main cause for process loss in boards.  
Relationship conflict 
Conflict is a fact of group existence (Bettenhausen, 1991). Forming consensus 
within a group can be time consuming, especially if additional time and energy is 
required to solve conflicts between individual group members. Drawn out debate 
between two individuals within a group can lead to disengagement by other 
members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), reduced communication levels and a decrease 
in overall group efficiency by diverting time and energy away from the group 
objectives (Shaw, 1981; Simons & Peterson, 2000). 
Groupthink 
While a lack of cooperation and restricted communication between group members 
can lead to a number of process failures, too much cohesion within a group can also 
limit effectiveness. Groupthink, “(a) mode of thinking that people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members striving for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses for 
action” (Janis, 1972, p. 9), occurs in strongly cohesive groups where members aim 
to avoid conflict through agreement. While groupthink results in a desired 
consensus it is likely to limit the decision making process by recommending a 
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course of action that may not be the most optimal. That is, the group arrives at 
consensus but sacrifices decision-making rigor in favour of preserving relationships 
(Janis, 1972). 
While group cohesiveness contributes to groupthink, it is not sufficient to produce 
groupthink alone, and it must also be accompanied by an absence of cognitive 
conflict (Janis, 1982; Mullen & Cooper, 1994; Rosh, Offermann, & Van Diest, 2012). 
This would suggest that the ideal level of compatibility on a board is sufficient to 
enable members to interact and cooperate effectively but not so much that they all 
think the same way. Some have suggested boards are especially susceptible to 
groupthink due to norms of politeness and courtesy and focus on consensus within 
set time frames (Bainbridge, 2002; Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008). 
2.2.4. Summary of Board Behaviour and Board Group Dynamics 
The unique nature of a board is such that a diverse set of people who meet 
infrequently are required to interact and draw on their collective pool of 
experiences and knowledge in order to resolve complex problems and make critical 
decisions.  
This section of the literature review has described the importance of pursuing a 
behaviour-based agenda for future research in corporate governance. Integral to 
that is recognising that as a group the ability for the board to participate in open 
and frank dialogue is fundamental to achieving board effectiveness. 
The director selection process is fundamental to who is appointed to boards and 
therefore has a significant impact on board dynamics. In the following section I 
review the corporate governance literature on director selections.   
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2.3. Director Selection: Addressing the Research Questions 
Selection of new directors is critical but largely absent from the literature (Withers 
et al., 2012). While a number of studies have attempted to link board composition 
to organisational performance, fewer have delved deeper into the director 
selection process (Kim & Cannella, 2008).  
In a recent review of the director selection literature Withers et al. (2012) 
concluded scholars have typically considered director selection through one of two 
lenses. Firstly, a rational economic perspective suggests a director’s appointment is 
determined by their individual skills, knowledge and expertise. Secondly, a socially 
embedded perspective suggests a director’s appointment is dependent on the 
social preferences and biases of those tasked with the selection decision. While 
noting actual selections are likely to take account of both of these perspectives, 
Withers et al. (2012) highlight the lack of integration in the two perspectives as a 
limitation in the existing literature which fails to provide a holistic view of the 
criteria under which directors are selected. 
Of particular note from the Withers’ review is the almost complete lack of attention 
scholars have given to board dynamics as a director selection criterion. This is at 
odds with the importance with which board dynamics has been attributed to 
overall board effectiveness and discussed earlier in section 2.2.1. 
This section of the literature review is organised by considering literature relevant 
to the two research questions raised by this study; (1) what criteria are applied in 
director selection and (2) how are directors selected. This study adopts and extends 
on two common perspectives described by Withers et al. (2012): an economic 
rationale perspective and socially embedded perspective. It is also noted that these 
two perspectives align to the two distinct approaches scholars have taken in 
examining board effectiveness discussed earlier in this chapter; a traditional 
economic view and a board behavioural based approach.  
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2.3.1. What criteria are considered important in director selections?  
Selection criteria from a rational economic perspective  
Research from an economic perspective assumes that the individual judged most 
able to execute the role of a director and thereby positively influence governance, 
align shareholder interests and contribute to organisational performance will be 
selected onto a board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Two theories dominate the corporate 
governance literature in regard to the function of the board and subsequently form 
the foundations of the economic perspective of director selection.  
Under agency theory it is assumed that those who are best able to monitor 
management would be selected as directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theory 
therefore emphasises independence as a key criteria in director selections (Daily et 
al., 2003). 
Resource dependence theory scholars assert that directors are selected primarily 
on how well their occupational and functional experiences match the needs of the 
organisation (e.g. Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972).  
Most scholars agree that in order to fulfil their governance roles of both monitoring 
and advice provision, boards require directors with a high degree of skill, 
knowledge and experience (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Thus 
to be effective boards must be composed of individual directors who contribute 
capabilities to match the requirements of the organisation (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). Researchers have considered various types of director 
capabilities thought to lead to effective board performance, with most adopting the 
terminology of human capital and social capital (e.g. Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
Human capital refers to an individual’s specific skill set, knowledge and experience 
that guide what directors pay attention to and how they frame decisions (Johnson 
et al., 2012). Various studies have therefore sought to understand the relationship 
between directors’ human capital and board appointments. For instance, CEO 
experience (experience as a CEO of a high performing firm) has been reported to 
increase the likelihood of an appointment to a board (Fich, 2005). Research has also 
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shown that the appointment of an ex-CEO to a board is well received by investors 
(Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2010). Other types of experience considered to 
influence board appointments include industry-specific experience (Kor & Misangyi, 
2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009) and political experience (Etzion & Davis, 2008; 
Hillman, 2005).  
Social capital from an economic perspective typically refers to an individual’s 
external connections. Directors who have external connections and links can 
contribute additional information and resources to an organisation and therefore 
are likely to be selected (Kim & Cannella, 2008). In particular the number and 
prestige of directorships an individual has may influence subsequent appointments 
to other boards (Mizruchi, 1996). A number of studies have found a relationship 
between directors with more external linkages and organisational performance 
(Bohren & Strom, 2010; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). On the other hand, some 
researchers have noted that multiple directorships can distract directors and 
thereby limit their ability to monitor adequately (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 
2003; Jackling & Johl, 2009).  
The type of skill, knowledge and abilities sought by boards is unlikely to be static 
but rather changes in response to external factors. That is, boards will seek 
individuals with different capabilities depending on the tasks required of them. 
Organisational performance, strategy and life cycle stages have all been considered 
to impact the capabilities a board seeks when recruiting (Hillman et al., 2000; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) such that board requirements will 
evolve with the organisations’ operating environment. As has already been 
described earlier in this section, board composition studies from an economic 
perspective seek out a relationship between the board and corporate performance. 
That is, these studies are interested in who sits on a board rather than why an 
individual is selected (Withers et al., 2012). They consequently fail to explain the 
determinants of selection or consider the impact of group dynamics and 
interpersonal relationships in the selection decisions. 
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Diversity on boards, in particular with relation to gender, is an area of the literature 
that is gaining more interest. While gender diversity is not an implicit focus of this 
study, external pressure for boards to become more diverse is having an impact on 
director selections in Australia, especially for those boards with high public profiles 
(Moodie, 2001). From a resource dependence approach female directors are 
considered to bring unique and diverse knowledge and resources to the board 
(Burke & Leblanc, 2008; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). While many studies have 
considered the effect of gender diversity on board performance, less have studied 
the effect of gender on director selection. Studies have reported similarities in the 
reasons for selection between both women and men (Burke, 1997; Mattis, 1993). 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) found that gender effects selection; for instance where a 
female leaves a board the position is more likely to be filled by another woman. 
They also found better performing companies were more likely to appoint a female 
director than poor performing firms. Another study based in New Zealand found 
that some appointments into New Zealand Government owned enterprises boards 
were for diversity reasons rather than on merit and balance (Norman, 2006). 
Selection criteria from a social perspective  
Research from a social perspective suggests the selection of an individual to a board 
is driven not necessarily by their perceived ability to execute the board’s roles of 
monitoring and resource provision, but rather by other motivations such as 
relationships and power. 
Most common in this stream of research is the notion that director appointments 
are driven by pre-existing relationships (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; 
Useem, 1980; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). While many scholars have criticised boards 
for the influence of social ties on board appointments, some scholars have 
acknowledged that there are benefits derived by recruiting from a known pool of 
candidates (Kim & Cannella, 2008). 
Section 2.2.2 outlines the unique circumstances under which boards operate, 
including infrequent meetings and being comprised of mostly outsiders who act on 
a part time basis. Due to these unique characteristics, group cohesion may not 
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come naturally to boards (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). It has further been 
reported that a lack of cohesion inhibits boards from working effectively (Kim, 
2005). This suggests cohesion should be an important determinant in director 
selections, however literature into director selection frequently fails to recognise 
this by focusing primarily on an individual’s potential to contribute to the company 
(Page & Spira, 2000). Despite this lack of attention, empirical evidence has shown 
that directors recognise the importance of subjective selection criteria including 
such facets as compatibility with existing board members and collegiality. A survey 
of directors into director selection found “compatibility was repeatedly mentioned 
first, and seemed to stand out as these directors’ most important concern” (O’Neal 
& Thomas, 1995, p. 84). 
In a conceptual study Kim and Cannella (2008) propose that the ability of a board to 
function as a team increases when directors are tied socially to one another and 
consequently a candidate who is known, liked and trusted by the incumbent 
directors is more likely to be selected than one who is not known, especially on 
highly cohesive boards. While there is little empirical evidence within corporate 
governance to support this, research from other fields of research indicates that 
social benefits are derived from a group who share a common background. 
Specifically, social similarity, meaning the degree to which individuals who interact 
have a similar identity, plays an important role in developing confidence and trust 
which in turn creates a more predictable reciprocal relationship (Kim & Cannella, 
2008; Marsden, 1988).  
Given the importance of trust and cohesion for groups such as boards of directors 
(discussed earlier in this chapter), the comfort of knowing an incoming director and 
therefore being able to predict their behaviour is a likely motivator in director 
selections. This is evident in the reported strength and reliance on established 
networks for director appointments (Davis, 1993; O’Neal & Thomas, 1995; Useem, 
1984). While the majority of studies suggest that relationships drive director 
appointments, Ingley and Walt (2001) found results to the contrary. In a survey 
study of 157 New Zealand directors they found an individual’s reputation, skills, 
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knowledge and the ability to conform to board values were all more important 
criteria in director selections than being known to a member of the board. 
Westphal (1999) considered the benefits of social ties and found personal 
relationships between the CEO and outside directors increased their interaction and 
thereby the ability for outside directors to provide advice by building trust in the 
boards’ support as well as the boards’ social obligation to provide assistance to the 
CEO. Related to this, Stevenson and Radin (2009) found that the existence of prior 
relationships increases the ability for directors to speak up and thereby influence 
decisions.  
Despite research supporting benefits of strong interpersonal relationships amongst 
board members, the dominance of agency theory in corporate governance 
emphasises independence (Daily et al., 2003; Kim & Cannella, 2008). However, as 
mentioned earlier, the dominance of agency theory has been challenged and the 
link between independence and performance found to be inconclusive and may 
even have a negative relationship (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Additionally scholars have 
noted that too much independence on a board may have an unintentional 
consequence of reduced trust, limited communication and increased conflict 
(Langevoort, 1989).  
Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat (1990) suggested that appointing directors from 
social ties may negatively impact board effectiveness when a new director feels 
obligated to support the decision maker responsible for their appointment, often 
the CEO. Another often cited repercussion of recruiting from the personal networks 
of the CEO is the increased willingness of board members to accept managerial 
entrenchment where adverse consequences have been reported to include pursuit 
of suboptimal investments (Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 1996) and suboptimal risk positions 
(Zwiebel, 1996). 
An individual’s prestige, reputation and external connections are known to 
influence director appointments. Director status, prestige and reputation can signal 
organisational legitimacy to investors and external stakeholders (Certo, 2003) and 
therefore is likely to increase a candidate’s attractiveness in director selections 
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(Withers et al., 2012). A director’s reputation and prestige is also likely to influence 
whether that director chooses to accept an appointment to a board as they will 
look to maintain or enhance their own social standing (Johnson, Schnatterly, 
Bolton, & Tuggle, 2011).   
Summary and motivation for research question 
The small groups’ literature suggests two predominant influences driving group 
member selection. Firstly, people prefer to work with others with a track record of 
success (Blanchard, Weigel, & Cook, 1975; Gilchrist, 1952; Shaw, 1976) and hence 
will look for competence and experience, especially in a task-orientated group 
(Shaw, 1981). Secondly, individuals are attracted to those who are similar to them. 
Similarity to others becomes more important when group tasks are more uncertain 
and ambiguous (Kanter, 1977) and where groups are required to work 
interdependently (Baron & Pfeffer, 1994).  
Translating these findings into a board setting where tasks are complex and 
interdependency is required for critical decision making means directors are likely 
to be selected both for economic reasons such as skills and experience as well as for 
social reasons such as similarity between the candidate and decision maker. While 
the corporate governance literature has considered both of these determinants, 
scholars have typically considered selection influences through a single lens at a 
time (Withers et al., 2012). That is, the selection criteria has been considered from 
an economic perspective or a social perspective but seldom from both. 
Consequently there are limited studies that examine how boards prioritise these 
selection criteria and balance the two criteria. 
One study that does consider multiple selection criteria is that by Kim and Cannella 
(2008). They note that there are competing influences in director selections. They 
point to a natural tendency to select someone that you know and can therefore 
trust (a social perspective) and an external pressure to select individuals who can 
best meet the organisational needs (an economic perspective). They suggest 
younger organisations and organisations where political and legal forces are 
powerful are more likely to select directors who can contribute needed resources 
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while more established organisations and those with a greater performance record 
are more likely to be influenced by social factors. 
The intent of this study is to consider simultaneously the two perspectives from the 
literature considering director selection determinants by asking current directors, 
what criteria they consider important in selecting new directors. This is the first 
research question of this study.  
2.3.2. How are directors selected?  
A general limitation of research into boards of directors is the gap between the 
theory and the reality (Monks & Minow, 2011; Roberts et al., 2005). This gap is 
particularly evident in the literature on director selections that typically describes 
how boards should select directors with little examination of how they actually do 
select (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995).  
The lack of attention given to real world selection practices may indicate an 
assumption that the selection process is formal and uniform. The literature often 
refers to director selections as a process that involves four distinct stages: 
identification, screening, selection and appointment (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Withers et al., 2012). Yet research indicates there is no uniform process for 
identifying and evaluating candidates (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995) and that variations 
exist in how directors are identified and selected (Huse, 2007; Moodie, 2001).  
Selection practices from an economic perspective 
The frequency and impact of corporate failures at the turn of the century resulted 
in increased shareholder activism and the subsequent legislation and guidelines 
aimed at improving corporate governance (Adams et al., 2010). This has also had an 
impact on the way directors are appointed to boards. There is now greater 
consideration for the needs of the organisation, increased use of nomination 
committees and a widening of the candidate pool through extended search 
practices (Huse, 2007; Monks & Minow, 2011). Additionally the greater emphasis 
on balancing gender and increasing minority representation within boards has led 
to wider search practices. 
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In Australia guidelines have been issued to publicly listed companies for structuring 
the board. In particular recommendation 2.4 of the ASX corporate governance 
guidelines suggests boards should establish a nomination committee while also 
noting that responsibility for selection rests with the full board. Further, the 
guidelines provide for greater transparency by encouraging disclosure of board 
selection practices to shareholders (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). The 
policy of voluntary disclosure in favour of mandatory requirements is based on the 
notion that effective corporate governance practices deemed valuable for investors 
would be implemented regardless (Carson, 2002).  
Along with Australia, in most developed countries including the US, UK and Canada, 
there has been encouragement for organisations to use selection nomination 
committees to identify the needs of an organisation and make subsequent 
recommendations to the board. The expectation from the regulatory viewpoint has 
been for nomination committees to decrease the influence of the CEO on the 
selection process and thereby increase the level of independence and monitoring in 
the resulting board (Huse, 2007; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). Research has 
supported this notion showing that the presence of an independent nomination 
committee does in fact decrease the influence the CEO has over the selection 
process. Studies have shown a positive relationship between the existence of a 
nomination committee and the appointment of an individual who has a reputation 
for active monitoring over management (Eminet & Guedri, 2012; Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999).  
In 2012, 72% of the top 200 publicly listed companies in Australia had a nomination 
committee that met the ASX corporate governance guidelines, leaving 28% who did 
not meet the requirements (AICD, 2012). While this indicates there is a move by 
large corporations to adopt governance guidelines and a shift toward more 
transparent practices, there is limited available information reporting how the 
selection practices of other smaller organisations are changing. 
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Selection practices from a social perspective 
While agency theory promotes independence and regulatory pressures as pushing 
for more transparency and accountability, research suggests directors continue to 
be recruited in an informal and social manner (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995). The most 
prominent theme from the literature from a socialised perspective focuses on the 
reliance on personal contacts for identifying director candidates.  
Typically researchers have taken the view that when the CEO selects directors from 
their own personal network the result is a lack of independence, fostering board 
passivity and diminishing the ability of the board to monitor management 
(Hermalin & Weisback, 1988; Johnson, Ellstrand, Dalton, & Dalton, 2005; Wade, 
O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). The CEO’s influence over the director selection 
process was seen as particularly prevalent prior to the commencement of the 21st 
century as was noted by Lorsch and MacIver in their 1989 qualitative study. 
However, Lorsch and MacIver noted a shift in behaviour around selection practices 
suggesting the emergence of nominations committees along with public pressure 
for independence and greater transparency. Despite this, the pool for identifying 
candidates has remained a shallow one with a continued reliance on established 
networks (Burke, 1997; Leighton & Thain, 1993; O’Neal & Thomas 1995; Van den 
Berghe & Levrau, 2004). In the Australian context, Sheridan and Milgate (2005) 
conducted a study of ASX publicly listed directors. They found 68% reported being 
identified through a recommendation of the CEO or incumbent board member with 
less than 10% recruited by a search firm. Further, the results were similar for both 
male and female participants. Similar results were found by Moodie (2001).  
Where the CEOs are involved in the selection process there is a greater risk the 
appointment will be made in self-interest and the appointed director will monitor 
less aggressively (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Westphal 
and Zajac (1995) found that where CEOs held greater power relative to the board 
they were more likely to influence the selection process and appoint an individual 
with similar demographic characteristics to themselves in order to reinforce their 
relative power. Conversely they suggested that where the board held greater 
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power the CEO would have less influence over selections and the appointed 
director would be more likely to resemble the board. This suggests there is value in 
wider board involvement in the selection decision. 
While the ‘old boys’ network has been used to characterise the reliance on personal 
relationships for identifying new board members, results show it is relevant not 
only for ‘boys’ but also for women. Burke (1997) surveyed women directors in 
Canada to examine how they were identified for selection. Overwhelmingly (62%) 
mentioned they had pre-existing relationships with the CEO, Chair or an incumbent 
board member. Less than 5% indicated they had been identified through a search 
firm. These results were similar to those previously found by Mattis (1993). 
Similarly informal selection practices that rely on pre-existing relationships have 
also been found to be prevalent in the non-profit sector (Parker, 2007). 
Formally candidates for board appointments must be voted on by the shareholders 
but in reality the final selection decision is made by either the Chair, a sub-
committee or the entire board (Monks & Minow, 2011; O’Neal & Thomas, 1995). In 
organisational behaviour literature the value of group involvement in the selection 
decisions has been long recognised. Argyris (1964) urged organisations selecting 
new personnel to involve the individuals from the group in which they would work, 
expressing that this would not only create alignment with the job requirements but 
also with “[the] particular subculture” of the group (Argyris, 1964, p. 270).  
Allowing the incumbent board to be involved in the selection enhances the 
opportunity for rapport building and creates both support and acceptance for the 
newcomer (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2007). Boards face obstacles in 
developing strong team norms due to the limited time they spend together. This 
may pose a challenge when new directors join a board. The selection approach can 
play an important role in communicating team norms to candidates and 
establishing a rapport with the incumbent members prior to the first board 
meeting, meaning they can contribute sooner. By including the wider board in the 
selection decision, directors are more likely to integrate the new recruit into the 
group, avoiding exclusionary feelings that may lead to tension and conflict 
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(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). This notion is consistent with the decision-making 
literature that indicates participation in decisions leads to greater acceptance and 
satisfaction (Bettenhausen, 1991). Existing members of the board as well as the 
CEO are also well placed to understand the needs of the organisation (Huse, 2007) 
and are therefore able to assess which candidate can best meet the board 
requirements.  
In order to increase board effectiveness, Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) 
encouraged boards to “get to know and understand the other people on the board, 
to develop chemistry” (p. 110). The logical place to begin developing this chemistry 
necessary for board cohesion is at the selection stage.  
Another area of corporate governance research into director selections has focused 
on the impact of impression management. Ingratiatory behaviour in the form of 
flattery, opinion conformity and favour rendering can influence director selection 
and compensate for a lack of skills and knowledge. Westphal and Stern (2006, 
2007) found individuals who engage in these forms of behaviour toward those who 
control board access have a greater likelihood of being appointed. These results are 
supported by research into human resource decisions that indicate ingratiatory 
behaviour increases the chance of selection (Higgins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Kristof-
Brown, Barrick, & Franke, 2002). 
Summary and motivation for research question 
Similar to the criteria for director selection, the selection approach itself appears 
also to have conflicting influences. The dominance of agency theory along with 
growing regulatory and shareholder pressure suggests that the process should be 
transparent and objective. On the other hand, there is a long tradition of appointing 
directors informally as well as a strong influence by the CEO/Chair. Arguments for 
both formal and informal selection practices have been presented in the literature. 
While there have been suggestions that traditional informal selection practices 
have been replaced by a more rigorous approach there remains little empirical 
evidence of how boards select new directors and how they balance the social and 
economic influences in selections.  
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The second research question to this study directly addresses this gap in corporate 
governance knowledge by asking directors, how do they select new members? In 
particular the question focuses on the source for identifying candidates (open or 
closed networks) and the level of board participation in the selection decision.  
2.4. Chapter Summary 
The selection of a director is a critical component of board performance, yet we 
know little of how and why directors are selected.  
Many researchers have adopted an economic perspective to consider the skills and 
expertise necessary for the board to fulfil its governance roles while others have 
addressed the social influences that drive board appointments. What is missing is a 
holistic view of how boards balance these two influences. And while a repetitive 
theme in the research is the strong reliance on relationships in direction selections, 
there has been little investigation into why. 
This chapter has noted a growing body of research recognising the role of board 
dynamics in board performance. Yet how boards account for board dynamics in 
director selection is largely absent from the literature. 
Traditionally boards have appointed new directors in an ad hoc and informal 
manner, relying heavily on personal networks. More recently regulators and 
shareholders have created pressures on boards for more transparency and rigour in 
their selections. There has been little research to indicate the extent to which these 
external pressures are impacting the director selection process. In addition the 
findings of prior research are quite dated and therefore not reflective of these 
recent external pressures. 
This study aims to address this gap and provide a more complete picture of how 
and why directors are selected by considering the criteria deemed important for 
selecting new directors and the process adopted to identify and select candidates.  
The next chapter presents an overview of the research approach and methodology 
adopted to meet this research aim and address the research questions. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design 
3.1. Philosophical Approach 
How research is conducted is influenced by the researcher’s philosophical position 
and the objective of the research (Crotty, 1998). The objective of this research is 
described within Chapter 1. In summary, the purpose of this study is to understand 
how and why directors are selected by drawing meaning from the experiences of 
non-executive directors across Australian non-profit, publicly listed and government 
sector organisations. The overall aim of the study is to explore the variances that 
exist within the selection approach and selection criteria that effect selection 
decisions. The purpose of the study is therefore both descriptive and exploratory. 
In order to achieve the research aims it is necessary to examine experiences of 
participants. As such the philosophical positioning or epistemology falls under the 
constructionism tradition. Constructionism claims that individuals construct 
meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting. In this way, meaning 
is not created but rather it is constructed (Crotty, 1998). My intent for this study is 
to make sense of the meanings described by the participants in order to inductively 
develop a pattern of meaning, interpret that meaning and identify new constructs. 
Furthermore this study adopts an interpretivist theoretical perspective that argues 
knowledge is socially constructed and that truth is relative to those involved in the 
research (Willis, 2007). The theoretical perspective provides the context for and 
basis of logic from which to explain social reality (Crotty, 1998).  
Qualitative research is consistent with this theoretical positioning. Qualitative 
research interprets meaning from the experiences of individuals including how they 
interpret, understand and experience the social world (Creswell, 2013; Mason, 
2002).  As such this study adopts a qualitative study mode.  
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3.2. Rational For Research Design  
Recognition that board composition has a critical impact on board effectiveness has 
led to a vast number of investigations into the characteristics of the directors who 
make up a board (this was discussed in detail in Chapter 2). These studies, mainly 
derived from a positivist approach, have sought to establish relationships between 
the board composition and organisational performance by relying on archival data.  
Considerably less corporate governance research – in particular board composition 
research - has been explored through qualitative methods (McNulty, Zattoni, & 
Douglas, 2013). While existing research informs us how boards are structured and 
provide profiles of individual directors who sit on boards, relatively little is known of 
how directors are selected or how a new board appointment can impact board 
effectiveness (Dalton et al., 1999; Withers et al., 2012). Consequently it has been 
recognised that to better understand board effectiveness corporate governance 
research requires greater first-hand empirical data that describes board process 
and board behaviour (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992; van Ees et al., 
2009).  
Chapter 2 of this study highlighted the increased level of interest in the human-side 
of corporate governance, described by Sonnenfeld (2002) as “the missing 
ingredient” in attempts to understand boards’ effectiveness. Qualitative research 
brings this human element to research by illuminating the human interactions and 
meanings that underlie a phenomenon (Gephart, 2004). Qualitative data 
complements quantitative data and therefore the aim of this study is to 
complement existing research by providing deeper insight into the complexities 
that exist within director selection from the viewpoint of those who have been 
involved in the process. 
There is limited existing research that implicitly examines director selection and in 
particular the questions addressed by this study. As such this is an exploratory 
study and therefore requires a research method to suit exploratory research. 
Qualitative research is best suited to address issues of description, interpretation 
and explanation (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchelll, 2011; Lee, 1999). The strength 
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of qualitative research lies in its ability to observe everyday life through interpretive 
frameworks, to get close to the context of the study and uncover social processes 
by capturing real world experiences (Creswell, 2013; Van Maanen, 1979). 
The methodological aim of this study is to draw meaning from the first-hand 
experiences of individuals who had participated in director selections to provide 
insight into the criteria and process applied in selections. To capture the 
perceptions and participants’ experiences, interaction between the participants and 
the researcher has been deemed most appropriate (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). 
The broad research aim of this study is to understand what influences a person’s 
appointment to a board from the point of view of those who have been involved in 
director selections. While existing qualitative studies have informed us of the skills, 
qualifications and demographic profiles of appointed directors they have not been 
able to explain whether such factors have been the primary reason for an 
individual’s selection. That is, while a quantitative study may highlight the number 
of ex-CEOs appointed to boards, it cannot explain whether being an ex-CEO is a 
significant criteria in selection decisions or if other less quantifiable factors 
influence appointments (for example the ex-CEO may know the existing board 
members and therefore is more likely to be appointed). The aim of this study is to 
address these gaps by exploring recounted experiences of director selections. 
Qualitative research, and in particular In depth interviews, derive meaning from 
experiences – that is how people interpret, understand and experience the social 
world and how social experiences are formed and how experiences are given 
meaning (Creswell, 2013). This method of research is therefore best placed to 
address the research questions of how and why directors are selected. Such level of 
detail would not be possible from a survey or other quantitative method. 
Interviews are particularly useful when participants cannot be observed (Creswell, 
2013). One reason for the dominance of quantitative research for boards of 
directors is the inability to directly observe boardroom processes due to access 
difficulties. Directors are well known for being busy (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007), and 
furthermore the content of boardroom discussions is highly sensitive (Daily et al., 
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2003). For these reasons many researchers have described board behaviour as the 
‘black box’ of corporate governance (Daily et al., 2003). However, Roberts et al. 
(2005) noted that although board access is difficult it is not ‘insurmountable’ and a 
number of corporate governance scholars have recently contributed valuable new 
knowledge through qualitative studies to both theory and practice (Brundin & 
Nordqvist, 2008; Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Maitlis, 2004; Parker, 2007). 
This study has adopted a qualitative approach using in depth interviews designed to 
gain insight into the director selection. In doing so a central contribution of this 
research is to aid the opening of the ‘black box’ by increasing the understanding of 
how and why directors are selected onto boards.  
3.3. Role of the Researcher in the Study 
The researcher plays a critical role in qualitative research and the role of primary 
data collector necessitates an initial identification of personal values, assumptions 
and biases. In this way the researcher’s contribution to the data collection can be 
useful and positive rather than damaging (Creswell, 2013; Locke, Spirduso, & 
Silverman, 2013). A potential threat to qualitative research, particularly research 
involving single researcher interviews, is bias during data collection. One way to 
combat such bias is for the researcher to identify and declare personal views so that 
readers can assess for possible bias (Lee, 1999). 
My perception of director selection has been shaped by my own involvement as a 
director on a non-profit board as well as my own knowledge of boards in general 
developed through academic research and current affairs media. As a current board 
member (since 2010), I have first-hand experience of director selections through 
my own involvement in the selection of two other board members. Additionally, 
through informal conversations with other board members, I have gathered 
background knowledge surrounding the aspects of director selection that raise 
questions, controversy and conversation. 
This understanding has helped to set the context for this study and as such has 
enhanced my own awareness of the issues surrounding the research topic. The 
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knowledge and experience I share with the study’s participants has assisted in 
communicating with other directors and eliciting valuable information from the 
participants. However, these previous experiences and knowledge can also create 
certain biases that impact how the data is interpreted. By being aware of these 
biases, efforts have been made to override them throughout the design, collection 
and analysis stages and thereby maximise objectivity. For example, demographic 
characteristics can influence personal values, and therefore the sample strategy for 
this design sought to balance those of the researcher (female, 40 years old) with a 
broader range (male, all ages) to ensure the responses were not biased toward 
those of my own. 
3.4. Data Collection 
3.4.1. Sampling procedure  
Unlike quantitative research, where participants are sought to represent the 
population of interest (often through a random selection process), qualitative 
sampling often involves selecting participants who can best inform the purpose of 
the study by providing meaning to the research questions (Creswell, 2013; Marshall 
& Rossman, 2011; Patton, 1990). The purpose of this study was to extract meaning 
from first-hand experiences of director selection in order to understand the 
variances that exist within director selections and the criteria considered important 
to selections decisions. For the purpose of this study it was therefore not logical to 
select respondents randomly but rather participants were purposefully chosen 
based on their prior experience in selecting directors (Lincoln & Guba 1985).   
An objective of this study has been to reveal variances from the participant’s 
experiences in director selection. As such I intended the sample to include 
representatives from different organisational sectors including for non-profit, 
publicly listed and government organisations. Variance is expected between these 
three sectors as they have different levels of ownership and face different levels of 
accountability. For example, publicly listed corporations are large organisations 
owned by a vast range of public shareholders and are subject to disclosure 
obligations under the Corporations Act (2001). In contrast, non-profit organisations 
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vary from very small to large and are accountable to their members, while 
government organisations face a high level of public accountability through various 
levels of government and public bodies.  I chose to exclude private companies from 
the sample set due to their unique nature and differences in board structure. For 
example, this study focused on the experiences of non-executive directors yet 
executive directors and family shareholders largely represent private companies. 
Furthermore the regulations and codes of best practice that shape board structure 
in publicly listed, government and non-profit organisations do not typically apply to 
private companies.     
A second objective of this study was to obtain a rich mix of experiences and 
impressions. As such I intended for the sample to include participants from both 
genders and a range of functional backgrounds and age groups. By identifying 
patterns and variation from participant perspectives, new and interesting insights 
can emerge (Patton, 1990). 
In order to achieve the desired level of variety in the sample, I initially approached 
five non-executive directors to participate in the study. These five directors were 
known to me through prior professional networks and were selected based on their 
cross-sector representation. Two were directors of non-profit organisations, one 
was from a publicly listed organisation, one from a government sector organisation, 
and one held director positions on boards of non-profit, government and publicly 
listed organisations. Additionally this initial sample represented both genders and a 
range of age groups. A sixth director was introduced to me through a colleague. All 
six directors that were approached agreed to participate in the study. 
A snowball technique was then applied (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I asked initial 
participants for recommendations of persons who may be willing to participate and 
could contribute meaningful insights to director selection. This resulted in an 
additional four directors being identified. These four directors were subsequently 
approached and they also agreed to participate in the study. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
how the 10 final participants were selected applying purposeful and snowball 
sample strategies. 
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Figure 3.1 Sample selection process 
 
Profile of participants  
Of the final sample set, four were male and six were female. The directors ranged in 
age from 36 to over 51, a spectrum of more than 15 years. All participants were 
non-executive directors and six participants held a Chair position. Some directors 
held multiple board positions across sectors. In total eight participants held a 
directorship in the non-profit sector, four held positions in the government sector 
and two directors held positions on publicly listed company boards. The profile of 
each of the 10 participants to the study is summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Profile of Participants 
ID Sector Position Gender Age group 
Non-
profit 
Publicly 
listed 
Government 
1 X   Chair Male 41 – 50 
2 X   Chair Male 51 + 
3 X   Chair Male 30 - 40 
4 X  X NED Female 41 - 50 
5 X X X NED Female 30 - 40 
6  X  NED Female 41 - 50 
7 X   NED / Chair Female 41 – 50 
8 X  X Chair Male 51 + 
9 X   Chair Female 41 - 50 
10   X NED Female 51 + 
 
The intent of this study is to draw from participant experiences of director 
selection. Of the 10 participants many were able to recount more than one 
selection experience as well as some being able to draw meaning from their own 
personal experience of being selected. In total 24 selections were recounted during 
the interviews.  
In each of these 24 selection decisions, data was collected to identify the source of 
candidates, the process of selection and the criteria deemed most important for the 
selection.  
The data collected from these 24 processes formed the basis of the data analysis 
and consequently the findings presented in Chapter 4. Table 3.2 outlines each of 
the 24 processes that were described and used by this study. 
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Table 3.2 Selection Approach Described for this Study 
ID Sector Position Selection:  Own / 
Another 
1a Non Profit Chair Another 
1b Non Profit Chair Own 
2a Non Profit Chair Another 
3a Non Profit Chair Another 
3b Non Profit NED Own 
4a Government NED Another 
4b Government NED Another 
4c Government NED Own 
4d Non Profit Chair Own 
5a Non Profit NED Another 
5b Non Profit NED Own 
5c Publicly listed NED Own 
5d Government NED Own 
6a Publicly listed NED Another 
6b Publicly listed NED Another 
6b Publicly listed NED Own 
7a Non Profit NED Another 
7b Non Profit Chair Own 
7c Non Profit NED Own 
8a Non Profit Chair Another 
9a Non Profit Chair Another 
10a Government NED Another 
10b Government NED Own 
10c Government NED Own 
N = 24    
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Profile of organisations 
I sought to sample selection practices from organisations of different sizes, 
industries and sectors. This was intended to provide insight into how director 
selection practices may differ in different organisational settings. To date there 
have been limited empirical comparisons of this nature (Machold & Farquhar, 
2013). 
The 10 participants recounted experiences of director selection from 18 different 
organisations. Of these nine selections (half) were from non-profit organisations. 
These were predominately community service and health organisations. Five 
selections from government organisations were described. These ranged in industry 
including health, recreation, defence and utility supply. The remaining four 
organisations for which selection processes were described were of publicly listed 
corporations. These were representative of the mining, engineering and chemical 
industries. Each organisation is detailed in Table 3.3. 
43 
 
Table 3.3 Organisational Details 
ID Sector Size(1) Industry 
1a Non Profit Medium Community Services 
1b Non Profit Medium Community Services 
2a Non Profit Medium Community Services 
3a Non Profit Small Community Services 
3b Non Profit Small Community Services 
4a Government Very Large Utility supply 
4b Government Medium Sporting & Recreation 
4c Government Large Health 
4d Non Profit Medium Finance 
5a Non Profit Medium Sporting & Recreation 
5b Government Large Utility supply 
5c Publicly listed Very Large Engineering 
5d Non Profit Medium Sporting & Recreation 
6a Publicly listed Very Large Industrial Chemicals 
6b Publicly listed Very Large Mining 
6c Publicly listed Very Large Mining 
7a Non Profit Medium Community Services 
7b Non Profit Medium Sporting & Recreation 
7c Non Profit Large Health 
8a Non Profit Large Community Services 
9a Non Profit Small Community Services 
10a Government Very Large Utility supply 
10b Government Very Large Defence 
10c Government Very Large Utility supply 
Note 1: Size refers to 2012 revenues in AUD.  Small <5m, Medium 5m<>200m, Large 
200<>500, Very Large >500m 
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Designing the interviews  
The design of the interview guide is an important step in the interview process 
(Mason, 2002). Detailed planning helps to increase the depth and richness of 
responses received and ensures the research objective and questions are addressed 
(Patton, 1990). Planning can also aid in reducing the potential effect of interviewer 
bias that can arise due to the researcher’s own values and assumptions (discussed 
in section 3.3). 
I designed an interview guide that included key themes to be addressed, example 
questions that would elicit the desired information and potential probes. The 
process of developing the interview guide helped me to identify what questions 
should be asked and how they should be phrased, ensuring data collection 
addressed the research objective (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Consistent with the exploratory nature of the research study, I designed the 
interview guide to be flexible and taken as a framework rather than a set of fixed 
questions. Broad topics and questions were prepared to guide the conversation and 
ensure the research questions were addressed but flexibility was allowed in the 
interpretation by participants opening up the interviews for new ideas and themes 
to emerge. This approach is consistent with one of the principles of qualitative 
research whereby the phenomenon of interest should unfold through the eyes of 
the participants and not through that of the researcher (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). Although less structured interviews were adopted at the beginning of the 
data collection process, the later interviews became progressively more structured. 
This allowed for more targeted data collection around the relevant themes that 
were emerging and which I deemed important to the research aim.  
In order to obtain rich, thick descriptions of the selection approach, I structured the 
interview questions around the participant’s experience. This was to encourage 
specific examples of what did occur rather than general comments. I asked 
participants to recall a recent selection they were involved in when answering 
questions. For example, participants were asked, Can you describe a recent 
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selection you have been involved in?  How did you identify candidates? Who was 
involved? Why was the successful individual chosen over others?   
The interview guide also included a brief introduction of my background, the 
research intent and me. To avoid bias in participant responses the study was 
described in a very broad sense and I avoided discussing preconceived propositions 
or emerging themes. An initial question was asked of participants to detail their 
experience as a director and their involvement in director selections. While this 
provided interesting context for the remainder of the discussion and later analysis, 
it also provided a form of ‘ice-breaker’ and an opportunity for me to develop a 
rapport with each participant in order to encourage more open and frank 
discussion. The interview guide is included in Appendix 1. 
Conducting the interviews 
The interviews were arranged to take place at a location that was convenient for 
the participant and that would be quiet and private enough to enable good quality 
audio recordings and comfortable enough to elicit free flowing dialogue (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009).  Three interviews took place at the office of the directors, three 
in a meeting room at the university, one at a cafe chosen by the participant and one 
in a meeting room at the Qantas Club at Brisbane Airport. Two further interviews 
took place over the phone where the participants were interstate and travel was 
deemed unnecessary and impractical.  
I undertook a phase of preplanning prior to each interview that involved reviewing 
information about participants in order to develop a profile of their functional 
background and experience on boards as well as other contextual information 
about the organisations they represented. For example, I looked at the Linked-in 
profiles and board member profiles on company websites. Prior to each interview I 
also reflected on prior interviews to consider any necessary amendments to the 
interview guide or interview style. 
The success of qualitative studies come from the researcher’s ability to build trust 
and maintain good interpersonal relationships with the participants (Marshall & 
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Rossman, 2011).  As such I aimed to develop a rapport with each participant prior 
to the interview. I did this by contacting each participant by phone to arrange the 
interview and took that opportunity to discuss informally how the interview would 
be conducted. Phone was used rather than email as it gave me an opportunity to 
build a rapport with the participant and answer any questions that may have been 
on the mind of the participant with regards to the interview protocol. Some 
participants were concerned with the sensitivity of information that may be 
discussed and this initial conversation gave the opportunity to reassure the 
participant of the interview confidentiality. 
Interviews were conducted in a conversational style aimed at encouraging 
participants to offer deeper insights (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). Questions were 
open-ended and I was familiar with the interview guide. As each interview was 
audio-recorded there was no need for me to take notes, so the interview was able 
to flow without interruption, enabling me to remain focused on the aim of the 
research. Where possible I asked questions that were open-ended. This avoided the 
risk that participants would be led by my own perceptions and also allowed for 
more detailed responses and unanticipated experiences being shared. Furthermore 
in order to draw deep and rich experiences from participant responses, questions 
were asked in a situational context.  
As the conversations were designed to be flexible and responsive to participant’s 
interpretations the interviews varied in duration between 33 and 58 minutes 
(further details are in Table 3.4 below). Each interview was transcribed verbatim 
and the audio recording used as a backup for the transcript. A third party was 
engaged to perform the transcription and all participants were advised this would 
be the case. To ensure the interview was accurately transcribed I listened to each 
recording while reading the transcribed data. This process also provided meaning 
and context around the words and ensured the right context was captured in the 
transcript. 
I maintained a research diary before, during and after the data collection process. 
The diary was used to record details of participants, preparation notes and post 
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interview reflections. Post interview reflections were also made immediately 
following each interview on the contact summary sheet (section 3.5.5.1) to capture 
any feelings I had following the interview as well as what worked well, what didn’t 
and ideas for improving the interview style for subsequent interviews. The research 
diary was also used to record the researcher’s initial assumptions and therefore 
biases. By being aware of the researcher’s own feelings with regard to the 
questions being asked, efforts could be made to challenge these and thereby bring 
about more objectivity.   
An interview checklist was prepared to remind me of several important stages in 
the data collection process. This included making sure consent was received and 
permission was given for audio recording, offering to provide a summary of the 
findings to participants and asking whether the participant was happy to provide 
follow up information if necessary. The checklist also prompted me to ask the 
participant for introductions to other suitable individuals who may be interested in 
participating. Finally the checklist reminded me to send a thank-you post-interview 
email and to file all necessary forms and notes. The post-interview checklist is 
included in Appendix 2. 
Table 3.4 Interviews Conducted and Interview Data Collected 
Date Location Interview 
duration 
(mins) 
Transcript 
length  (words) 
Segments of 
coded data(1) 
31/07/12  West End, Bne 58.26 6584 14 
20/08/12  Teneriffe, Bne 36.41 5859 19 
4/08/12  Hamilton, Bne 40.02 5584 17 
21/09/12  By phone 38.19 5924 15 
27/08/12  QUT, Bne 57.51 6923 16 
31/08/12  Brisbane City 38.46 6441 19 
14/08/12  QUT, Bne 46.42 8770 20 
17/09/12  Brisbane Airport 47.53 7622 23 
13/08/12  QUT, Bne 33.10 5358 24 
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23/08/12  By phone 51.22 6171 15 
     
Totals:  7.45 hours 65,236 words 182 coded 
segments 
 
Note 1: Segments of coded data refer to a phrase, sentence or paragraph to which a 
code was attached during the data analysis phase. 
3.5. Data Analysis 
The objective of data analysis in a qualitative study is to determine categories, 
relationships and assumptions that reflect the participants’ view of the world in 
general and of the research topic in particular (McCracken, 1988). This is achieved 
by segmenting the data, taking the data apart and then putting it back together 
again (Creswell, 2013).  
Data analysis in qualitative research is iterative and cyclical (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Unlike quantitative research where data is collected and 
analysed in separate stages, qualitative data analysis can take place throughout the 
research and can be interwoven into the data collection process (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Additionally, since qualitative data is so dense and rich, typically 
not all of the information can be used (Creswell, 2013). Analysis of qualitative 
research therefore requires a process of focusing in on the relevant data and 
disregarding the remainder.  
Throughout the analysis stages of this research I followed an iterative process of 
constant comparison between the data and theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Isabella, 
1990; Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Suddaby, 2006). Evidence of this iterative process 
is most obvious throughout section 4.5, which describes the emergence of a 
subsequent research question and further round of iteration between established 
theory and the data.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates the data analysis process I followed showing a number of 
interlinked stages. These are summarised into three broad processes: (1) data 
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preparation, (2) data coding and (3) data interpretation. Each is discussed in the 
following section. 
Figure 3.2 Data Analysis Process 
 
3.5.1. Data Preparation 
The first stage of data analysis involved organisation and preparation of the raw 
data and a preliminary review of the data available. As has already been 
mentioned, 10 interviews were conducted and each transcribed by a third party. 
Once each interview had been transcribed I read through the transcribed data while 
listening to the original audio recording. This had two benefits, firstly it allowed me 
to make corrections or complete any sentence where the recording had been 
indecipherable during transcription (there were a few instances). Secondly, it 
allowed me to make notes regarding the tone or emphasis by the participant. For 
example, if something was said in jest or stressed a note was made in the margin of 
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the transcript to record this. This process also allowed me to gain an early sense of 
what ideas were coming through the data.  
At this stage of the data analysis I commenced a journal to record general ideas, 
themes and thoughts as they came to mind. The process of reflective memo writing 
(section 3.5.5.2) provided an opportunity to reflect on the meaning that was 
emerging from data. While reading through each transcript in this early phase I 
referred back to the contact summary sheets prepared at the time of each 
interview. The contact summary sheets (section 3.5.5.1) recorded details of each 
participant and the initial thoughts and ideas that emerged from the interview. 
These were re-read in conjunction with the transcript to refresh my initial 
observations including any observations about how the participant responded to 
the questions and whether they seemed particularly focused on one aspect of the 
director selection approach, helping to provide context to the data.  
3.5.2. Data Coding  
Data coding plays a pivotal role in data analysis. It involves breaking the data down 
into segments and assigning each segment with a meaningful word or term that 
represents a category of the data. Assigning codes to the data not only facilitates 
the reduction of data but it also encourages the researcher to reflect on the data, 
and to interact with it (O’Dwyer, 2004).  
I commenced the coding of the data once the first transcript was complete. A 
method of constant comparison was adopted for reviewing each line, sentence and 
paragraph segment of the transcripts. I performed coding at three levels – open, 
axial and selective (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Each stage of coding is described in 
further detail below. Throughout the process a data analysis journal was kept to 
record themes and ideas resulting from the coding process. 
Open Coding 
Firstly, open coding was applied to develop initial categories and reduce the data 
into manageable sized ‘chunks’. This first step of coding involved an immersion of 
the data. The data was read and re-read noting noticeable categories and recording 
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ideas and themes. A starter-list of three structural codes was used for coding 
categories. These codes were developed around the process of director selection 
and were reflective of the interview guide. For example the code ‘how’ was 
attributed to any excerpt in the data that referred to the process of how directors 
were selected, ‘why’ was attributed where the dialogue described the criteria 
applied to a selection and ‘who’ was attributed where the dialogue described the 
selection outcome. Excerpts that did not fit into these three categories were 
assigned to a further code of ‘other’ (Machold & Farquhar, 2013). The ‘other codes’ 
were kept aside and later considered for relevance to the research aim. These initial 
codes were structural and not content specific but provided an important 
framework that allowed the data to be broken into manageable sized pieces and 
provided a logical framework from which a second layer of open codes could be 
inductively developed. As the analysis preceded a second layer of open codes was 
identified through a more inductive coding process, allowing flexibility for context 
specific codes to flow and form from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Figure 3.3 
illustrates how these initial structural codes were used to develop further sub-
codes and themes. 
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Figure 3.3 Structural Coding Map 
 
I then developed a further set of open codes by considering a number of sensitising 
questions such as: What is going on here? What is the data conveying? Is it relevant 
to the research aim? What does it explain about the director selection process? This 
process helped me to remain focused on the research aim and not be distracted. 
Where a segment of data was deemed relevant to the research objective I indexed 
it with a code. Initial concepts were named either using the wording by participants, 
‘in vivo codes’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) or a simple descriptive phrase that conveyed 
the meaning of the data segment.  
Since participants were likely to have a different perspective on the event 
depending on whether they were selecting or being selected, exerts that described 
the participants own selection were coded as such. In these instances the data 
often differed, as the participant was unable to provide the same level of insight 
into some areas such as the boards motivation for the selection, but were able to 
provide another level of insight in other areas, such as the feedback received on 
why they were selected. As such by identifying whether the participant was a 
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candidate or a part of the recruiting board enabled the coded data to be analysed in 
the right context and provided greater meaning to their recounted experience.     
I coded segments under as many categories as appeared relevant which at times 
led to some segments being coded into more than one category. Categories lacking 
sufficient supporting data or found to be irrelevant to the research aim were 
discarded or incorporated into other more relevant emerging categories. This 
process of constant comparison was repeated until no new codes emerged and no 
new insights revealed. This indicated saturation had been reached (described 
further in section 3.5.3).  
The processes of assigning and revising codes generated 26 different codes. Coding 
categories were recorded in a central register as well as on the original transcript 
where codes were recorded in the margins. An example of the coding book is 
illustrated in Table 3.5. The coding register is attached in Appendix 3.  
Table 3.5 Code Book Example 
Code label  Sub-Code Description Quote example 
IDENT 
Identifying 
candidates 
EXTERNAL  
 
External sources 
Show transparency 
 "It's always through search 
firms so they can say in their 
remuneration report you 
know we looked at our board 
composition, we decided we 
needed this and that, we 
hired a search firm and we 
ended up with ... " 
 
NETWORK Network reliance 
Candidate is known 
Passive selections 
"We said to the directors, do 
you know anyone with these 
skills …and you think they're 
interested then let us know"  
"We should be thankful for 
anyone who's interested" 
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Axial coding 
Secondly, a process of axial coding was undertaken to “reassemble the data that 
was fractured during the open coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 124). The axial 
coding of the data involved a process of interconnecting codes and providing more 
abstract names that were more reflective of the essence of the data. To do this I 
looked for causal conditions that described: What are the main influences in the 
director selection process? What are the outcomes of these influences? 
During the axial coding stage sections of the data were recorded onto note cards. I 
applied a colour scheme to reflect the emergent conceptual themes and sub-
category codes. Each card was cross referenced to the original transcript recording 
the participant name and page number so that the original source could easily be 
accessed if greater context was needed. Throughout the process of writing up the 
note cards, reflection and new insights were often stimulated. These were also 
recorded on note cards and cross-referenced to the card that had prompted the 
thought. I opted for a manual-coding scheme over a computerised one as I felt it 
afforded greater immersion and interaction with the data and removed the 
distraction that can come with computerised software. I also found a manual 
system more flexible allowing for more free flowing ideas and diagrams. The small 
data set of 10 interviews meant manual coding was viable and not overly onerous. 
Examples and evidence of coded note cards are included in Appendix 4. 
Selective coding 
The final level of coding I undertook was selective coding. Selective coding is a 
process for selecting the central or core categories of the study, and systematically 
relating them back to the other categories, filling in categories that needed further 
refinement (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I created selective codes by connecting and 
consolidating the axial codes. Through doing so a story began to emerge describing 
the central themes of this study and providing the foundation for the findings that 
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are discussed throughout chapters four and six. This process is further described in 
section 3.5.4. 
3.5.3. Evidence of saturation 
Saturation is the point where no new insights are revealed through data collection 
and data analysis. It therefore indicates the point at which data analysis is complete 
(Bowen, 2008; Charmaz, 2006). This study undertook a process of coding and 
constant comparison through which categories and relationships were identified. 
During the process of constant comparison, themes and ideas were also recorded 
using reflective memo writing. Categories were refined as similarities and 
differences were identified. Categories with commonalities were consolidated while 
single incidents or categories with minimal evidence were discarded, as these were 
deemed less critical. As themes developed it became clear when theoretical 
saturation was being reached. Once no new insights were revealed I felt the 
information had been exhausted and that the coding process had ended.  
3.5.4. Data interpretation 
The final phase of the data analysis involved aggregating the final codes and 
categories into overarching themes that reflected the core themes of the study and 
would therefore provide the foundations for the study’s findings and conclusions. I 
spent a lot of time reading back over memos and the reflective notes that had been 
taken during data collection and coding and then re-read the coded note cards to 
see how the categories were related to each other. As the coding had been done on 
manual note cards I was able to physically group, disassemble and re-group the 
cards to provide meaningful explanations and insights into the central research 
questions. Figure 3.4 illustrates an example of the coding process and final data 
structure corresponding to the research question: What are the main criteria in 
selecting directors? 
The iterative process of data collection, coding and data analysis resulted in a 
number of central themes that addressed the research problem and provided 
answers to the two original research questions along with a third additional 
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research question that emerged during the analysis process and which was able to 
be addressed through a further round of iteration between the theory and data.  
Figure 3.4 Data Structure Map: Selection Criteria 
 
3.5.5. Other Data Sources 
While the interview process provided the main source for this study’s findings, I 
also relied on a number of other data sources to capture insights, emergent themes 
and reflections. These included a contact summary sheet and a reflective journal 
and memo cards.  
Contact Summary Sheet 
Both prior to and on completion of each interview I prepared a contact summary 
sheet that summarised contact with a participant. This included the major themes, 
issues and problems that had arisen during the interview. Emergent and recurring 
themes were identified so that they could be followed up in subsequent interviews 
while gaps were identified for inclusion in further data collection. 
The contact summary sheet – a double sided A4 page – included logistical details 
about the interview and information about the participant’s experience as a 
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director (how long and in what sectors) as well as their involvement in director 
selections. Additional information was recorded regarding any biases or strong 
feelings a particular director expressed as this information may have influence over 
participant responses and how they conveyed their experiences. An example of the 
contact summary sheet is in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6. 
Reflective Journal and Memo Writing 
Glaser (1978) described memo writing as “the theorising write-up of ideas about 
codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding” (p. 83). As 
such, reflective memo writing plays an important role in allowing the researcher to 
capture developing thoughts and bring together the pieces of data into concepts. 
Reflective memo writing was conducted throughout the data analysis process of 
this study using two sources. Initially I kept a coding journal to record ideas, themes 
and anticipated problems that arose during the early coding process. Later as the 
coding process moved to memo cards, reflective memos were also written up on 
note cards. The memo notes were dated, titled and sorted into the respective 
research themes and categories.  
3.6. Ethics 
Ethics approval for this study was received from Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) in July 2012 (approval number 1200000312). The research study 
was considered to be of low ethical risk based on the contents of the interview data 
being behavioural and therefore did not involve any commercially sensitive 
information. Furthermore, since the participants were all non-executive board 
members and therefore high achieving and successful members of the community, 
they were not considered to be a vulnerable group. 
Consent was obtained from each participant via a signed consent form prior to 
interviews. Participants were advised they could choose whether or not to 
participate and during the interviews they could choose whether or not to answer 
any question. Participants were also given the option for the audio recording to be 
stopped at any stage, or not used at all, and for any matter deemed sensitive to be 
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removed from the transcripts. The participant information and consent form is 
included in Appendix 7. 
3.7. Establishing Trustworthiness 
The quality of qualitative research is judged by its trustworthiness that can be 
considered by four criteria: (i) credibility, (ii) transferability, (iii) dependability, and 
(iv) confirmability. These four criteria parallel the more conventional dimensions of 
internal validity, external validity, reliability & objectivity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Shenton, 2004). Each is considered below in the context 
of the current study and summarised in Table 3.6. 
3.7.1. Credibility  
Ensuring credibility is one of the most important factors in establishing 
trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Paralleling internal validity, the credibility 
of a study refers to the accuracy with which the phenomenon of interest has been 
identified and described, and asks the question: How congruent are the findings 
with reality? (Merriam, 1998).  
The following provisions were made in this study to promote confidence and 
increase credibility. Firstly, the study relied on in-depth interviews for data 
collection. In-depth interviews were chosen as they enable rich descriptions and a 
deep understanding of the participant’s experiences. Secondly, the style adopted 
during the interviews was iterative and open-ended. This provided the opportunity 
to confirm or disconfirm my understanding of participant responses. Finally, care 
was taken to establish a relationship of trust with the participants and as such I felt 
all dialogues were open and frank. 
Although purposeful sampling was initially applied as a sample strategy, the second 
stage of snowball sampling reduced any influence I may have had on sample bias. 
This second stage of snowball sampling also increased diversity of informants. I 
aimed for diversity in the data sources by gathering data across a range of sectors 
(non-profit, government and publicly listed), genders and age groups, thereby 
offering multiple viewpoints and experiences that could be verified against each 
59 
 
other to form a richer picture. Finally, peer scrutiny was encouraged and I sought 
opportunities for feedback over the duration of the project from other research 
students and two research supervisors as well as other academics.  
3.7.2. Transferability  
Transferability parallels with the traditional notion of external validity and is 
concerned with the extent to which the study’s findings can be transferred to other 
situations (Merriam, 1998). The nature of qualitative inductive research is such that 
the findings are specific to a small number of particular environments and 
individuals, thus statistical generalisability is impossible to achieve (Shenton, 2004).  
The objective of this study, as in most qualitative research, was to achieve depth 
rather than statistical range. This has been achieved through the use of rich 
descriptive narratives from in-depth interviews. As such thick descriptions and 
contextual details are provided throughout this study, this enables the transfer of 
the concepts to other settings and contexts. 
3.7.3. Dependability 
Dependability refers to the study’s reliability and asks; if the work were repeated in 
the same context, with the same methods and same participants, would similar 
results be obtained? (Shenton, 2004). Establishing dependability requires a clear 
description of the data collection and coding practices and a logical integration 
between the data collection, interpretation and conclusions. Throughout the 
research design chapter of this study I have provided in-depth details of the process 
I took during the data collection and analysis phases. Additionally I have included 
the codebook and resulting data structures as attachments to this study, making 
them available to others who may be interested in replicating this study. 
3.7.4. Confirmability  
Confirmability relates to the objectivity of the study and requires the researcher to 
ensure, as much as possible, the findings of the study are reflective of the 
experiences and ideas of the participants and not the preferences of the researcher 
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(Shenton, 2004). The social nature of interviews creates a threat to achieving real 
objectivity since a level of bias by the researcher is inevitable. Eliminating the 
influence of the interviewer would be impossible. Instead I set out to reduce any 
potential bias or influence over participant responses by using open-ended 
questions during participant interviews and allowing conversations to be directed 
by the participant’s experience rather than by my own theories. Secondly, the 
inductive process of the coding structure restricted researcher bias. Thirdly, a 
research diary was used throughout the data collection process to record my 
thoughts and reflections on each interview, including the extent to which I felt I was 
leading the participant. Finally, I have stated my own experience and perceptions of 
the director selection process in section 3.3.  
Table 3.6 Assessing the Trustworthiness of Qualitative Research 
Criteria Test Steps taken to increase 
trustworthiness 
Credibility Have the participant’s views of 
the world been successfully 
captured? 
In-depth interviews 
Open frank dialogue 
Iterative, open ended questioning 
(section 3.4) 
Transferability To what extent can the study’s 
findings be transferred to 
other situations? 
Detailed background context for 
the study 
Rich descriptions of how the 
study’s conclusions have been 
drawn (Chapter 4) 
Dependability If the study were repeated 
with the same methods and 
the same participants would 
similar results be obtained? 
In-depth details of the data 
collection stage (section 3.4) and 
data coding and analytical 
process (section 3.5) 
Confirmability Could an independent person 
confirm the study’s findings? 
Multiple data sources – coding 
journal, memos & contact 
summary sheet provide trail of 
researchers thoughts and 
reflections that guided study’s 
findings (section 3.5.5) 
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3.8. Summary and Methodological Fit 
Good research design requires consistency between the research question, the 
paradigm and the research method applied to answer it (Hallebone & Priest, 2009). 
The research described in this chapter has followed this logic.  
The exploratory and inductive nature of this research question fits into an 
interpretivist paradigm, as does the qualitative method chosen to answer it. 
Although there are some limitations to the research design, primarily from the 
threat of bias impacting the confirmability and restricted generalisability of the 
sample, these have been minimised through deliberate steps to increase the 
credibility and objectivity through a considered design of the data collection and 
analysis process.  
The topic of director selection has received limited explicit attention in prior 
research. In cases such as this, where the researcher is usually not fully aware of 
the details of the phenomena being studied, qualitative research is the best choice 
(Lee, 1999). It is suggested that qualitative research designs are best suited to 
studies that require a richness, holism and lived meaning (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Within this study the perspectives of the participants are central to the study 
and can best be interpreted through rich and deep descriptions. This is consistent 
with the strengths of qualitative research design. The alternative, research through 
quantitative designs, would neither be a logical fit with the current state of the 
literature nor would it provide the richness and substantial depth in description 
needed to answer the research questions.   
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Chapter 4. Findings 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 highlighted how early research into corporate boards describes informal 
selection approaches that rely heavily on the personal networks of the CEO, Chair 
and incumbent board members, an approach that has attracted ongoing criticism in 
the literature (Huse, 2007; Leighton & Thain, 1993; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Given 
this, a wealth of practitioner advice has emerged on how boards might better 
approach director selection. These prescribe a formal process following a standard 
approach – determine the board’s selection criteria, identify candidates, evaluate 
abilities against predetermined criteria, and select the successful new director.  
The findings from this study indicate current processes for selecting directors vary 
considerably within organisations and across sectors. While some selections are 
indeed formal and prescriptive many more are ad hoc, informal and continue to 
rely on closed networks.  
The results reported in this chapter are organised into a number of sub-sections. 
Section 4.2 directly addresses the first research question: what criteria are 
considered important in selecting new directors? It provides insight into the criteria 
against which prospective directors are assessed and consideration of which criteria 
is given primary focus in selections. Section 4.3 examines the second research 
question: how are directors selected? It moves beyond the criteria used for 
selection to document the processes adopted for director selection with an 
emphasis on the source of director candidates and the level of board involvement 
in the selection decision. These two components of criteria and process are 
synthesised in section 4.4 where a summary of four common selection approaches 
is provided, while section 4.5 describes the selection outcomes from the 
perspective of the participants. Finally, section 4.6 presents the findings from 
research question three: how does the selection approach impact the selection 
outcome?; an additional research question that arose from the findings of the 
original research questions. 
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4.2. Director Selection Criteria 
The findings from this study begin with participant responses to the question, 
“What criteria did the board consider important in selecting the new director?” 
There was an overwhelming theme that suggested ultimately selections came down 
to a criterion of how well a candidate would ‘fit’ with the existing board.  
The importance of ‘fit’ as criteria in selections was reflected in the strong and 
consistent use of the word ‘fit’ or similar terminology by all participants describing 
desired attributes of director candidates. 
For example, 
“The ultimate criteria is will they fit in…[it’s] the most important thing.”– 
Participant 8 
  “We had 3 people … it was just who was going to fit.” – Participant 3 
“We try to find people that fit the mould.” – Participant 1 
While ‘fit’ clearly emerged as an important criterion, it was less clear exactly how 
‘fit’ was defined. When pressed to explain what was meant by ‘fit’ participant 
responses fell into one of two categories suggesting ‘fit’ is a construct that can be 
considered both in terms of similarity and difference.  
On the one hand the participants revealed a strong preference for directors with 
similar values and personality traits to those of the existing board members:  
“It’s about the right personalities and the right capacity to be a member of 
the group.” – Participant 9  
At the same time there was recognition that potential directors needed to be able 
to fill a need in current board capabilities:  
“The discussion has been around what skill sets are we deficient in; what [is] 
the future direction of the organisation; what sort of skill sets will we need 
going into the future.” – Participant 7 
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Therefore a candidate’s perceived fit for the role of director appeared to be 
multidimensional and considered in terms of a group fit matching the values and 
characteristics of the current board, as well as a role fit filling a gap in board 
technical capabilities.  
4.2.1. Examining ‘fit’ from the literature 
The findings from this study appears to align to a large body of research from 
organisational behaviour that has examined human resource decisions. The 
perception of ‘fit’ has been found to be of great importance in recruitment while 
the actual definition of ‘fit’ is often difficult to describe (Judge & Ferris, 1992; 
Wheeler, Gallagher, Brouer, & Sablynski, 2007). This definitional ambiguity likely 
derives from the multi-dimensional nature of the construct. In selection decisions a 
person may be assessed as a good ‘fit’ from a number of reference points including 
the organisation, the group they are joining or the role they are being selected for.  
Person-organisation (also known as person-values fit), perhaps the most widely 
adopted definition of ‘fit’, is considered in terms of norms and value congruence 
between an individual and the organisation (Chatman, 1989). It is generally studied 
as a supplementary form of fit that guides both the organisation and individual’s 
behaviours and decision-making (Kristof-Brown, 2000).  
Person-group fit (also known as person-team fit) is derived from an interpersonal 
compatibility between individuals and their work group (Judge & Ferris, 1992; 
Kristof, 1996). Compatibility is considered to occur where an individual possesses 
similar characteristics to the others in the group (Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987) 
measured in terms of goals, values, attitudes and personality traits (Adkins & 
Werbel, 1994; Kristof-Brown & Stevens, 2001; Seong et al., 2012). Group fit 
facilitates cohesion and trust through value congruence and compatibility (Cable & 
Edwards, 2004; Seong et al., 2012). Person-role fit (also known as person-job fit) 
stems from a match between the organisation’s demands and the applicant’s 
qualifications, a demand-abilities fit or a match between the needs of the applicant 
and the supplies from the job (Edwards, 1991).  
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Person-role fit is differentiated from organisation fit and group fit as it is concerned 
with the technical aspects of the job rather than the values and characteristics of 
the candidate (Werbel & Johnson, 2001). Similarly, most literature has considered 
role fit as a form of complementary fit (Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987) in terms of 
skills, knowledge and abilities (Kristof-Brown, 2000; Sekiguchu & Huber, 2011) 
whereas organisation fit and group fit are considered as a supplementary form of 
fit. Table 4.1 summarises these three forms of fit as they are defined in the 
literature. 
Table 4.1 A Comparison of Types of Fit Considered In Selection Decisions 
(Literature Based) 
Type of Fit Level Form Basis 
Person-role fit Individual Complementary Technical skills, 
knowledge & abilities 
Person-group fit Group Supplementary Values  
Goals 
Compatibility 
Person-organisation 
fit 
Organisation Supplementary Values  
Norms 
Source: Adapted from Werbel & Johnson, 2001  
Adopting the definitions of Fit for this study 
By adopting the definitions from the human resource literature (summarised in 
Table 4.1), participants from the current study made reference to all three of these 
types of fit – organisational, group and role – as important considerations in the 
selection of new directors. Evidence of this alignment in definitions is displayed in 
Table 4.2. This figure provides evidence of the use of all three definitions of fit by 
the participants.  
Table 4.2 also illustrates that there was a far greater emphasis on group fit and role 
fit as opposed to organisational fit. This may be due to the position of the board at 
the apex of the organisation and therefore it may be assumed there is overlap in 
values and goals between the organisation and the board as a group. 
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Table 4.2 Examples of Participant Reference Made to Each Type of Fit as a 
Selection Criteria 
 
4.2.2. Group fit – board compatibility 
One of the strongest themes that emerged across the data was the emphasis for 
directors to be able to work well with one another. While teamwork is often 
emphasised as a desirable worker attribute, the results from this study highlight a 
Partic-
ipant
1 "We were looking for medical skills"
"We interview them to find out if 
they can be passionate about (the 
organisation)"
2
"We were looking for someone with 
a legal background ...  Everybody 
else has got other qualifications that 
are relevant to what we do but we 
don’t have someone with a legal 
background"
3
"Particularly we were looking for 
someone with some accounting 
background ...It was a big gap"
“you’re looking for a synergy” 
"(They) need to believe in the 
(organisational) cause” 
4 "you've got to be collaborative with 
you fellow board members"
5
"the board identified key skills we 
need going into the future looking at 
our strategic direction and that we 
didn’t have"
"that you’re not going to rock the 
boat and that you...we’re all going 
in the same direction... would be 
the key thing"
6
"we’re doing billion dollar projects 
and we don’t have someone who 
knows the right questions to ask"
"[looking for] someone you can 
connect with, find some common 
ground and discuss the chunky 
things"
7
"...the discussion has been around 
well what skill sets are we deficient 
in; what the future direction of the 
organisation; what sort of skill sets 
will we need going into the future"
 "it isn’t about each individual there, 
it’s about...at times you’ve got to 
make decisions and there’s got to 
be compromises on those decisions"
8
…" let’s find someone who’s had 
experience (and can) take us 
through to an IPO"
" You know will they get on with us?  
And that actually becomes almost 
the most important thing"
9
 we’ve identified we’d like someone 
with a legal background
“It’s about the right personalities 
and the right capacity to be a 
member of a group”
10
There were specific technical 
qualifications that we were looking 
for; an engineer, someone with 
derivatives experience; someone 
who could chair an audit committee.
"it is important that you get people 
that you can work with"
Role-Fit Group-Fit Organistaion-Fit
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strong need for the board to work harmoniously. In order to achieve this outcome 
there was an expressed desire for candidates with shared values, shared goals and 
compatibility with existing board members. Table 4.3 provides detailed evidence of 
how these three sub-themes emerged from the data. The excepts bellow provide a 
more condensed overview: 
In relation to value congruence; 
 “It’s about their values and you know what they stand for.” – Participant 6 
“That you know how that particular small culture works.” – Participant 5 
In relation to compatibility; 
  “You’re looking for a synergy.” – Participant 3 
 “Someone you can connect with, find some common ground.” – Participant 6 
And in relation to goal alignment; 
“That you’re not going to rock the boat ... we’re all going in the same 
direction.” – Participant 5 
The emphasis of a desire for a group fit was further explained when participants 
were asked, “Why is group fit so important?”  
In response, participants pointed to the unique characteristics of governance 
boards.  
Unlike other work groups, directors do not hold any formal power as individuals but 
rather formal power rests with the board acting as a group (Bainbridge, 2002; Baxt, 
2009), meaning board effectiveness relies on the ability of the board to make 
consensual decisions, and consequently disruptions to the decision making process 
may reduce overall board effectiveness. Additionally the infrequency with which 
boards meet and the fact that boards are likely to consist of part-timers who rarely 
work together means that cohesion does not come naturally to boards (Finkelstein 
& Mooney, 2003). Consequently participants expressed a need for harmony to 
ensure the effective functioning of the group: 
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“ You’re only meeting two hours every month so you’re looking for a synergy 
where you can just get on and do things … If there’s too much of a bridge to 
build it will slow progress.” – Participant 4 
Participants also expressed a recognised need for group fit through value 
congruence that would enable the board to function effectively during times of high 
stress; a time when too much difference could undermine the effectiveness of the 
group: 
“It’s about their values and you know what they stand for…When times get 
tough in the boardroom that’s what is going to come out and that’s what is 
going to be their goal post for decision making.” – Participant 6 
Thus there was a common theme amongst participants highlighting a strong desire 
to select a person who was perceived as compatible with the incumbent board. 
Further, group fit was expected to enhance timely and consensual decision-making 
and thereby contribute to overall board effectiveness. 
4.2.3. Role fit – complementing board capabilities 
While group fit emerged as a strong influence in director selection, there was an 
equally strong recognition that candidates required technical skills and knowledge 
considered necessary by the board in fulfilling its governance role (table 4.3). 
Whereas values and characteristics for group fit were described in terms of 
‘sameness’, the requirement for skills and knowledge was determined through a 
recognised absence in current board capabilities. That is, in contrast to the 
similarity invoked with respect to group fit, participants considered skills and 
knowledge from a configurational view of the board by assessing potential 
candidates against the current and future needs of the organisation. 
The following quote from one participant describes a desire for candidates to 
consolidate the core skills of the board:  
“We were hoping to get someone with some legal background to augment the 
skills [we have] already got on the board.” – Participant 2 
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It was also recognised that candidates should be able to contribute unique 
experiences that would enhance the board’s overall ability to carry out the tasks 
required of it, for instance monitoring:  
"We’re doing billion dollar projects and we don’t have someone who knows 
the right questions to ask." – Participant 5 
In determining the skill set and knowledge required from candidates, participants 
indicated their boards looked to the organisation’s strategic direction as the basis 
for identifying gaps and therefore the criteria for the selection: 
“We always look at what our strategic direction is for what [skills] we need in 
the next selection.” – Participant 7 
The results therefore indicate two dominant criteria for director selection: 
1. Group fit – defined by value congruence, goal alignment and 
compatibility with the incumbent board, and  
2. Role fit – defined as technical skills and experience to complement the 
present configuration on the board. 
Data supporting the interpretation of the ‘fit’ criterion from this study is presented 
in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Data Supporting Interpretations of the ‘Fit’ Criterion 
Category  Example Quotation From Interview Data  
 
 
 
            Role Fit 
Technical Skills “We were looking for someone with a legal background ...  
Everybody else has got other qualifications that are relevant to 
what we do but we don’t have someone with a legal background 
and there’s more and more legal issues coming up for the 
organisation…so we felt we needed someone with a legal 
background or at least legal training.”  
 
70 
 
Category  Example Quotation From Interview Data  
“Well we had a number of people retiring so one was an 
engineer; one was a finance guy with extensive derivatives 
experience which is important for [the organisation] and we 
were also looking for a Chair of our audit committee. So there 
were specific technical qualifications that we were looking for; 
an engineer, someone with derivatives experience; someone 
who could chair an audit committee.” 
 
"Particularly we were looking for someone with some 
accounting background ...It was a big gap." 
 
“The board identified key skills we need going into the future 
looking at our strategic direction and that we didn’t have.” 
 
“We wanted to have a discussion and fulsome review of the 
skills and behaviours and competencies we wanted to bring in.” 
 
“The discussion has been around well what skill sets are we 
deficient in; what’s the future direction of the organisation; 
what sort of skill sets will we need going into the future?” 
 
“The circumstances will mould the kind of experience rather 
than...and it’s more experience rather than a specific skill, it just 
means they’ve actually done it.” 
Experience "We’re doing billion dollar projects and we don’t have someone 
who knows the right questions to ask."  
 
“We were looking *for+ people with ASX200 experience either as 
an executive or as a director because we feel that at some point 
in the future [the organisation] is going to be sold in some form 
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Category  Example Quotation From Interview Data  
and we need 
 
 
 
             Group Fit 
Compatibility 
 
“It’s about the right personalities and the right capacity to be a 
member of a group.” 
 
“Each of us met this person one on one to gauge style and 
culture … how will I work with this person?” 
 
“[We were] looking for someone you can connect with, find 
some common ground and discuss the chunky things.” 
 
“You look at who they’ve worked with; whether you might know 
someone who knows them because it is important that you get 
people that you can work with.” 
 
“Will they get on with us?  And that actually becomes almost the 
most important thing.” 
 
“It is important that you get people that you can work with.”  
Value 
congruence  
“It’s about understanding what drives them; what they stand 
for; what their values are because when times get tough in a 
boardroom that’s what is going to come out and that’s what is 
going to be the sort of goal post for their decision making 
whether they know about mining or accounting or what have 
you, it’s going to be what’s their sort of moral compass.” 
Goal alignment “That you’re not going to rock the boat and that you...we’re all 
going in the same direction I think would be the key thing.” 
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4.2.4. What’s considered more important – group fit, role fit or both? 
While participants were clear of the ‘fit’ attributes desired in candidates, the study 
next considered: What is considered more important in selections; group fit or role 
fit? 
After describing the criteria for selection participants were asked if they had ever 
had to choose between two or more candidates and if so what was the basis for 
their decision. This question was designed to understand how the described criteria 
were prioritised. The responses varied, with many participants acknowledging it 
was situational and varied with organisational needs. 
While the relative importance of the criteria may have varied with context, it was 
clear that both group and role fit were considered important to a successful 
selection. Further the two criteria were considered to complement rather than 
compete: 
“You’ve got to have the right experience and the personal fit rather than just 
because you’re a great team player and a good person.” – Participant 10 
Similarly, another participant recounted a selection where the two criteria (skills 
and personality) were deemed equal in importance:  
“There was very specific skills and personality...I say it was an equal 
combination.” – Participant 6 
Participants recounted instances where the focus had been on only one or the 
other of these attributes, leading to a poor selection decision. 
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For instance, the following extract reflects a strong emphasis on group fit evident in 
the selection decision: 
“I think they asked someone to assemble some nice people that 
they could meet and then it was sort of like, ‘Oh well, we like that 
person’ as opposed to clearly mapped out skills and experience 
and then testing for style and fit and culture. It was more like find 
some nice people that sort of generally fit this and we’ll see what 
we think of them.” – Participant 6 
 
Another participant recounted a poor selection made solely on the business skills 
that the individual could bring to the board and the promise of a ‘good CV’. The 
board did not have an opportunity to meet the proposed new member and 
therefore did not have an opportunity to test how that individual would get along 
with the remaining group. 
“There was an unexpected retirement and one of the other board directors 
said ‘oh well we need someone from the business community and you know I 
can recommend X... he has a great CV’. Now that person came to the board 
and I couldn’t work with him. He was the most obnoxious character that I’ve 
ever come across in my life; had no knowledge of what the organisation did; 
had no connection to anything the organisation did.” – Participant 7 
In another instance, the criteria for selection were unclear and consequently the 
appointed director was unclear of their position on the board. When asked why 
they were selected it appeared they were simply in the right place at the right time 
and that there had been little consideration for the needs:   
“I don’t know exactly [why I was selected]. I don’t know what the motivation 
was. It was a bit strange the CEO asked me to come onto the board … The next 
AGM you’re in. And then we didn’t have a secretary so you can do that and 
that was it. And I’m the worst secretary in the world. It’s crazy, it’s not my skill 
set at all.” – Participant 3 
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While there were instances of singular emphasis on group or role fit – and an 
absence of both – many participants highlighted a balance to the selection 
approach that enabled assessment for both forms of fit.  
For instance, one participant described a decision process involving both role and 
group fit criteria. After selecting a prospective candidate based on role fit, the 
directors all met the candidate. Then, the participants reported that: 
“The Chairman came back to each of us and said ‘Now that you’ve 
met the person, what do you think?’ And everyone unanimously 
said we should take this person on, but also said there’s some style 
issues that we need to monitor. And so indeed that’s come up and 
indeed there’s needed to be a bit of coaching, but no regrets by 
any means.” – Participant 6 
Another example similarly described a process that followed a more prescriptive 
formula for identifying skill-based criteria followed by an assessment of group fit. 
The participant explained that a skills-gap assessment identified accounting as a 
necessary skill needed for the next board appointment. Once they had found 
candidates who met their identified skill need, the next assessment was one of 
perceived fit with the group. 
“We actually had three people all with accounting degrees apply for the role 
and all quite good and all ticked on the qual[ification] and the NFP interest, it 
was just who was going to fit.” – Chair, NFP 
The above excerpts highlight the importance of process in the ability to assess for 
each of the two criteria of fit. This gives rise to the questions: What approach do 
boards take in selections and how does the selection approach enable boards to 
assess for both role and group fit? 
These questions are addressed in the following sections.  
4.3. Different Approaches to Director Selection 
Section 4.2 highlighted a strong convergence surrounding the criteria for selecting 
directors; that boards desired candidates who met both the group and role needs 
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of the board. Yet despite the commonality across criteria for selections, the findings 
indicate significant variability in the approach boards take to identifying and 
selecting candidates. 
In total the 10 participants of this study described 24 separate selection 
appointments. While some approaches to selection followed a uniform and formal 
process many others were ad hoc, informal and heavily influenced by a single 
decision maker.  
Two significant variances in selection approaches emerged from the data. Firstly, 
the source from which potential directors are identified; and secondly the level of 
involvement by the board in the selection decision. Each of the 24 appointments 
recounted by the participants can be classified across these two aspects of the 
selection approach.  Table 4.4 summarises the approach adopted in each of the 24 
appointments using these two lenses. 
Table 4.4 Selection Approaches Followed 
 Candidate Identification:  
Source of candidates 
Selection Decision:  
Involvement of the board 
1 Board member networks Sub committee 
2 CEO network CEO & Chair only 
3 External advertisement Sub committee 
4 Membership base Sub committee 
5 CEO network Sub committee 
6 External advertisement Externally managed (no 
involvement) 
7 External advertisement Externally managed (no 
involvement) 
8 Chair's network Chair only 
9 External advertisement Involve 
10 Chair's network Chair only 
11 External advertisement All of board 
12 External recruitment firm All of board 
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13 Chair's network Chair only 
14 External advertisement All of board 
15 External advertisement Externally managed (no 
involvement) 
16 External advertisement Externally managed (no 
involvement) 
 Candidate Identification:  
Source of candidates 
Selection Decision:  
Involvement of the board 
17 Board member networks Minimal 
18 Chair's network Chair only 
19 External advertisement All of board 
20 External recruitment firm All of board 
21 External recruitment firm All of board 
22 External recruitment firm All of board 
23 Membership base All of board 
24 Board member networks All of board 
 
4.3.1. Source of Candidates 
The source of candidates described by participants in identifying potential directors 
varied from a broad use of open networks to a strong reliance on the closed 
networks of a single decision maker. Each source has been classified as either a 
closed or open network source. Classifications based on the data are illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. 
Closed networks describe situations where candidates are sourced from existing 
personal and professional networks of the Chair, CEO or incumbent board 
members. They are considered ‘closed’ to individuals unknown through these 
networks and therefore would not be considered for board appointments. On the 
other hand open network sources come from external sources open to individuals 
both known and unknown to the incumbent board.   
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Figure 4.1 Classification for Source of Candidate 
 
Closed networks 
In multiple instances there was evidence of boards relying on a single source for 
identifying candidates, most often the Chair.  
As one participant reported: 
“…a vacancy came up. The Chair knew someone and it’s less 
transparent [to me] as to how that person might have come 
about. Now my appointment to that board was exactly the same, 
so I don’t know why I was chosen.” – Participant 5 
This example highlights the influence of the Chair in selections and reliance on their 
own network for sourcing new directors. Another participant also acknowledged 
the reliance on personal networks and the influence of the Chair over board 
selections: 
“The majority of board appointments are still being filled by people known, 
especially to the chairman.” – Participant 4 
Reliance on closed networks to source candidates was not limited to only those of 
the Chair. In other instances the wider networks of the existing board were used for 
identifying potential new directors. 
In one example the networks of all board members were used to search for suitable 
candidates that met the predetermined criteria assessed by the board, with 12 
nominees resulting from the process. 
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“We did a skills thing and had a look at skills as well but ultimately we said to 
the directors, ‘do you know anyone with these skills, this is what we’re looking 
for’.” – Participant 1 
This example indicates a higher level of involvement by the wider board in sourcing 
new directors, and therefore a wider pool to draw candidates from. Yet it continues 
to illustrate a reliance on known sources for identifying new board members. 
The use of closed networks was most common amongst smaller organisations 
where board appointments were unpaid. Many participants from these 
organisations expressed a belief that it is difficult to find skilled directors to 
volunteer their time.  As a result boards may take a passive approach to director 
selections relying on internal networks to source people they think would be willing 
to join their board. In these instances it appears assessing ‘fit’ both in terms of role 
and group fit may be secondary to finding ‘someone who wants to be a director’. 
This attitude is expressed in the following excerpts. 
When asked how they distinguish between two competent candidates, one 
participant laughed at this notion stating: 
“If we had two candidates that would be a luxury.” – Participant 9 
Another participant reinforced this sentiment, describing the challenge many small 
non-profit organisations face finding quality directors:   
“It gets down to well we found somebody; what are they like; are they any 
good? And the reality is we haven’t got anybody else so they’ll do.” – 
Participant 8 
Despite multiple participants expressing an opinion that it was difficult to find 
suitable candidates for smaller non-profit board positions, another participant 
rejected this idea as is expressed in the excerpt below. 
The participant recounted an experience where the board had relied on a single 
recommendation of an incumbent board member rather than using a more open 
search, and the result had been a poor selection.  
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On reflection they noted that: 
“The starting position of the board was, well it’s going to be hard to recruit, 
no-one is really going to be interested in being on our board therefore we 
should be thankful for anyone who’s interested in being on the board… [it was 
like] going with the begging bowl.” – Participant 7 
However, in hindsight they acknowledged they should have adopted a wider 
search:  
“If we actually put out for expressions of interest there’d be a great lot of 
interest.”  – Participant 7 
Open networks 
At the other extreme of candidate search practices, participants provided ample 
examples of boards using broad and open processes for identifying candidates.  
One participant explained the process as well as suggesting its widespread use:  
“All the companies that I’m on and certainly dealings that I’ve had 
with people looking for directors, it’s always through search firms 
… we decided we needed this and that, we hired a search firm and 
look we ended up with [name of director] … and if you look at 
remuneration reports they [most other publicly listed boards] are 
actually doing that.” – Participant 6 
While historically boards have been criticised for the tradition of sourcing directors 
from closed networks, there was an expressed view by some participants that this 
practice was shifting to one of greater rigour with a greater reliance on broad, open 
sources. 
“It’s not just about a director being selected from acquaintances, I’m not 
comfortable with that, I wouldn’t use that process and I don’t think many 
good companies do.” – Participant 2 
The results support this observation. More participants described open search 
sources for identifying candidates than those relying on closed internal networks.  
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Open search mechanisms reported by participants included the use of board 
related websites such as Women on Boards and Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, public advertisements and the use of external recruitment consultants 
(head-hunters). This included board members encouraging qualified people they 
knew to be considered, as well as these other more open search tools. Table 4.5 
outlines the use of each source by sector. 
The results also indicate that the shift toward more open search practices was not 
limited to public and government sectors but organisations from the non-profit 
sector – who do not face the same level of scrutiny from stakeholders – had also 
relied on open sources for identifying candidates. 
Table 4.5 Types of Open Sources Adopted by Organisations by Sector 
Source Used by sector 
External advertisement Government organisations, 
Public companies 
Recruitment agency Government organisations, 
Public companies 
Board related websites Non-profit organisations 
Membership base Non-profit organisations 
 
Public Accountability 
The data suggests that where organisations face a high level of accountability there 
is a greater need to demonstrate a transparent and rigorous process resulting in a 
more open search for candidates. 
One participant acknowledged the impact shareholder lobby groups were having on 
director selection within the public sector:  
“There’s a fairly strong demand from institutional and also retail shareholders 
that you’ve gone through a process; that you’ve got a plan and that you didn’t 
just, you know, find someone through the network.” – Participant 4 
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Another participant supported this, suggesting corporate governance reporting 
guidelines were having an impact on the process for identifying new directors. 
“Boards are increasingly under pressure to be seen as being transparent and 
so the way they respond to that is to say well we’ll use an open transparent 
process ... you know, it won’t be our mates that we’re going to put up ... and 
those people will have been brought through the very best of people based on 
a criteria we agree on and its really up to us at that stage to then make the 
final choice.” – Participant 8 
The above comments, while indicating organisations are changing their selection 
practices in response to stakeholder pressure, also describe how in doing so they 
are increasing the rigour around selections by spending more time defining the 
needs and criteria for selection and opening themselves up to a wider candidate 
pool. The result – a shift away from traditional practices sourcing from closed 
networks – was generally well received by participants who acknowledged this shift 
as a positive change. 
“Even though they often do it I think for the wrong reason (referring to the 
reporting requirements); it’s very pleasing.” – Participant 8 
Although there appeared to be a trend toward more open sources for identifying 
candidates, participant comments suggested that established networks were still 
important in gaining director positions. Even where director candidates are 
identified through external search practices it is likely established directors are 
already known to one another and their reputation will influence the selection 
decision.   
“I think if you were to talk to head-hunters that were honest with you they’d 
say that when it gets down to it the person that knows somebody on the 
board has more chance of being appointed.” – Participant 4 
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4.3.2. Board participation in the selection decision  
Section 4.3.1 above suggests a range of sources from which potential directors are 
identified, describing both open and closed sources. Similarly the results indicate 
varying levels of board involvement in the selection of candidates.  
While participants overwhelmingly indicated meeting and interviewing candidates 
face-to-face was a critical step in director selection, not all processes recounted by 
participants allowed for this level of board involvement. 
In some instances the Chair alone appeared to select candidates and any board 
involvement was ceremonial. Other times, there was a small subset of directors 
involved in the process (the Nominations Committee) while sometimes all directors 
were involved in meeting and providing input on the candidates. There were also 
four extreme processes recounted where the selection was externally managed 
without any involvement of the board (including the Chair). Table 4.6 outlines the 
variability in the level of involvement of the board in the selection decision and the 
sector this was evident in. 
Table 4.6 Level of Board Involvement in the Selection Decision by Sector 
Level of involvement Involvement by board  Sector 
None No board involvement Government 
organisations 
Minimal Chair only Non-profit organisations,  
Government 
organisations 
Executive board members  Non-profit organisations 
Sub-committee Nominations committee Non-profit organisations 
All All of the board Non-profit organisations, 
Public companies 
Government 
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High level of board involvement 
Board member involvement in the selection decision was considered important for 
testing for the group fit of candidates. 
One such process was described: 
“…each of us met this person one on one to gauge style … testing 
for style and culture, so how will we ... how will I work with this 
person?” – Participant 10 
This stage of the selection was considered critical to determining whether a 
candidate should be appointed:  
“Until you sit down with someone and see if there’s a connection, do you 
respect that person … you don’t really know.” – Participant 4 
Importantly, this meeting of candidates also gave the opportunity to reject 
candidates on the basis that they weren’t a good match for the group: 
  “You’d be able to say ‘I don’t think they’re going to fit’.” – Participant 5 
The practice of involving incumbent board members in the selection of prospective 
candidates was also considered critical from the viewpoint of candidate selecting 
boards. 
Many participants indicated the opportunity to meet and get to know the board 
was an important part of their own decision process and had influenced whether 
they would accept a board position: 
“I got the opportunity to meet the board ... and decide whether I could work 
with them.” – Participant 10 
As well as whether they would reject a position: 
“I just couldn’t feel like I could create that common ground with them.”– 
Participant 6 
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While in numerous cases the whole of the board was involved, “It’s a whole of 
board decision.” – Participant 7; in other cases a smaller subset of the board met 
the candidates, for example a nominations committee.  
Also evident were appointments where the selection decision appeared to be made 
solely by the Chair. These appointments were typically dominated by the Chair and 
drawn from their own closed networks (for examples see section 4.3.1.1 above). 
No involvement by board  
At the other extreme, several instances were cited where the board (including the 
Chair) had no involvement at all in the actual selection process or decision.  
“…but [the search occurred] without any consultation to the board 
and particularly the Chair… The new directors start next month 
and the chairman and myself don’t even know these people. We 
weren’t consulted…”– Participant 4 
Perhaps more strikingly, these board appointments were often 
undertaken entirely by bureaucrats, with no involvement from the 
board (not even the Chair) to maintain the impression of impartiality.  
“Well the bureaucrats did the interviews and the recommendation 
went to the Minister and the Minister would have made the 
decision… 
“Government boards are notorious for that. They [emphasis 
added] look for a mix of people and they put them on the board.” 
– Participant 4 
The potential negative consequence of not involving the wider board was explained 
well in this example. Describing the reaction when a new director (who had been 
externally selected with no board involvement) came onto the board: 
“This one director, no one could get along with. He was problematic from the 
moment he walked in the room.” – Participant 4 
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4.4. Classifying Director Selection Approaches  
Section 4.3.1 described two different sources for identifying new directors – open 
and closed networks. Similarly, section 4.3.2 identified that selections were made 
with varying degrees of involvement from the board ranging from no involvement 
to involvement by all incumbent board members.  
Figure 4.2 has applied these two lenses to categorise four selection approaches 
common across the 24 selection approaches described for this study.   
Figure 4.2 shows a cross section of representation by industry sectors in most 
quadrants highlighting again the lack of consistency in selection approach, even 
within sectors and at times within the same organisation. The most widely 
dispersed sector is that involving non-profits. The figure also highlights that larger 
organisations are found at the two bottom quadrants where open sources are used 
for identifying candidates, supporting the suggestion that the more accountable an 
organisation the more likely it is to cast a wide search for candidates from broad 
open sources (refer to section 4.3.1.2 above). 
Each category of selection is described below along with an examination of 
selection outcomes from each approach. 
86 
 
Figure 4.2 Classification of Selection Approaches 
 
4.4.1. Traditional approach  
Informal, non-transparent, dominant decision maker 
Early research in corporate governance referred to an informal model of director 
selection that relied heavily on the ‘old boys’ club’, a closed personal network of 
the CEO and/or Chair. This traditional model has been widely criticised for failing to 
consider the skills and knowledge needs of the board and limiting the board’s ability 
to carry out its control and monitoring functions (Huse, 2007; Leighton & Thain, 
1993; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  
The findings from this study indicate that while this approach is still adopted by 
some organisations, it was not the most common approach. The extent of this type 
of selection is summed up well by one of the participants, who noted its existence 
remains yet also notes a conscious move away from traditional practices: 
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“Whilst I’m sure it still goes on that, this sort of old boys’ network, more and 
more so I think companies are realising that, you know, to stay ahead and be 
competitive you need the right diversity skills and so just asking who you know 
[to join the board] isn’t going to wash.” – Participant 6 
One quarter of appointments described in this study adopted a traditional selection 
approach. This was most common in the non-profit sector, where there is less 
pressure for selection transparency, and a perception of low supply. Traditional 
selection practices were also evident in the government sector. 
Selections taking a traditional approach are characterised by their reliance on 
closed networks, informality, a lack of transparency, and a dominant decision 
maker (typically the Chair) with minimal input from the wider board.   
One problem associated with a single decision maker in selection decisions is the 
extent to which there is greater potential for selection bias than in the case of 
multiple decision makers (Judge, Higgins, & Cable, 2001). A single decision maker 
increases the likelihood of that person selecting individuals like themselves 
resulting in a homogeneous board and low levels of diversity. The resulting 
problems could be a tendency for pressure on conformity through group think 
(Janis, 1972). A director selected by a single decision maker may also feel obligated 
to reciprocate resulting in showing support for the decision maker in decisions, 
especially if the decision maker is in a more powerful position i.e. Chair. 
Participants of this study acknowledged the shortcomings of the traditional model. 
One participant acknowledged this was not a practice they would adhere to today: 
“It’s not just about a director being selected from acquaintances, I’m not 
comfortable with that, I wouldn’t use that process and I don’t think many 
good companies do.” – Participant 8 
While the results indicate that this approach does continue, the data suggests the 
intentions and outcomes may not always be negative. 
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One Chair explained their role in the selection as a means of protecting the group 
dynamics: 
“I guess I see my role as Chair as a little bit of a cultural protector and making 
sure that [the] team tries to function the best way it possibly can.” – Chair, 
NFP 
In some cases the Chair dominance in selections was accepted by board members. 
One participant acknowledged this approach to selection had become part of the 
board norms: 
“That’s the culture of that particular Chair and that is how that board works.” 
– Participant 5 
The same participant expressed that they had been happy with the appointments 
the Chair had made to that board, even though they had been made without the 
wider board’s input: 
“I didn’t even meet the guy until he turned up ... he was a nice guy.” – 
Participant 5 
However, this sentiment was not always the case. In another example the 
participant recounted an appointment that had been made by the Chair without 
consultation with the board. They described the appointment as having a significant 
impact on the board that: 
“[after the appointment] the dynamics of the whole board just changed.” – 
Participant 7  
The results reflect mixed outcomes from this selection approach suggesting that 
when a single person dominates the selection decision, even with good intentions, 
there is a risk of a misfit being appointed that could result in a negative change to 
group dynamics, reducing overall board effectiveness.  
4.4.2. Socialised approach 
Reliance on social networks, board involvement  
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Selections categorised as social selections were characterised by a reliance on social 
networks to identify candidates and typically involved all of the board in the 
selection decision, thereby placing an emphasis on group fit. Within this study 
application of this selection approach was the least relied on with examples only 
cited from the non-profit sector. 
A socialised selection approach is described: 
“First we try to find people that fit the mould of what we’re looking for, then 
we interview them to see whether they can be passionate about things 
involving the organisation.” – Participant 1 
While the involvement of the board in these selections is likely to result in a group 
fit, the narrow source for identifying candidates (limited to those known to the 
board) may restrict the board from finding the best role fit.  
Group fit encourages group cohesion that in turn may lead to improved 
communication and trust between members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). However, 
too much cohesion within a group may also contribute to ineffective group 
decision-making. Conformity through groupthink can reduce the effectiveness of 
groups by reducing independent thinking (Janis, 1972). A board with high cohesion 
also risks being distracted from board matters by social discussions (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). 
Thus socialised selections are likely to result in a homogeneous board that are able 
to interact well with one another but on the other hand may lack the diversity 
needed to challenge and question management. 
As one participant described: 
“[T]hey’re using the old network ...  doing that sort of find some people who 
want to be a director you know.  You know well that doesn’t necessarily get 
you the right people.” – Participant 6  
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4.4.3. Considered approach 
Open, broad search and board involvement balancing both group and role fit. 
Selections adopting a considered approach are most in-line with the formal 
selection approach prescribed by practitioners. These selections adopt open, broad 
search strategies for identifying candidates who can meet the recognised needs of 
the board, and are therefore likely to result in a role fit. The involvement of the 
wider board in the selection decision also increases the ability of the board to 
assess candidates for a group fit.  
Of the 24 appointments described this selection approach was evident in almost 
half, making it the most common as well as the most widely used with examples 
from public companies, non-profit and government organisations. The widespread 
adoption of considered selections supports the suggestion of a shift away from 
informal selection approaches toward more rigorous and transparent practices. 
Unsurprisingly, considered selections were typical amongst the larger organisations 
that face external pressures and greater accountability. More surprising was the 
widespread application of this approach across a number of the small and mid-sized 
non-profit organisations. This indicates a real desire for organisations across the 
board to identify and appoint individuals who meet both the role and social needs 
of the board and therefore support the findings from section 4.2.    
The considered nature of this selection approach is evident in the following excerpt 
that describes a process that considers both the role and group fit criteria. Initially 
the board set out to identify their needs: 
“We wanted to have a discussion and a fulsome review of the skills and 
behaviours and competencies that we would want if we brought in someone 
else” – Participant 6 
After short-listing candidates who met the needs of the role (using open sources), 
each member of the board then met the final candidate then to assess group fit. 
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 “...the chairman came back to each of us and said now that you’ve met the 
person what do you think?”– Participant 6 
When asked how the appointment turned out, the participant responded there had 
been “no regrets by any means”. This suggests that the considered process adopted 
in the appointment had resulted in a successful selection. It also suggests that the 
involvement of the incumbent board may increase the level of acceptance and 
ownership over the selection decision. 
Another participant supported the idea that board involvement increases 
acceptance for selection decisions. They described their experience of joining a 
board following a rigorous and considered selection approach. They highlighted the 
immediate acceptance granted by the board: 
“I got told by the chairman that from the moment I walked into the 
boardroom I had the respect of the board because they knew the process and 
amount of rigour I’d gone through...Normally it takes time to build some 
credibility in the boardroom, but because of the process they all immediately 
gave me that respect.” – Participant 4 
4.4.4. Externally managed approach 
Focused on board role requirements, decision removed from board  
Four of the 24 appointments described in this study could be classified as externally 
managed, and all of these were examples from the Government sector. 
Externally managed selections have a strong focus on the role requirements and 
achieving a role fit. However, the lack of involvement by the incumbent board – 
both in identifying role requirements and in final selection – means there is no 
opportunity or ability to test for the group fit.  
The likely outcome is a highly skilled and competent board, but by ignoring 
consideration for the group fit there is potential for interaction difficulties. A lack of 
interaction can mean a board fails to fully tap into the resources and knowledge 
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available and therefore fails to reach its full potential due to process losses (Steiner, 
1972).  
This consequence is highlighted by one participant who described their own 
experience of being appointed onto a board through an externally managed 
process. While they had met the objective selection criteria neither the board nor 
the candidate had had an opportunity to test the group fit. Their comments suggest 
feelings of discomfort and uncertainty due to not being selected by that Chair or 
board and consequently a belief that they hadn’t ‘earned their stripes’:  
“... so for the first six months I just basically shut up, I wasn’t going to say 
anything, I needed to earn my stripes.” – Participant 5    
The feeling of having to ‘prove yourself’ to the Chair after being appointed to a 
board was expressed by another participant:  
“The first few meetings (the Chair) really tested me, like I felt like I was being 
scrutinised ... I was being tested.” – Participant 4 
Overall participants found fault in this approach to selection, primarily due to the 
absence of an ability to assess the group fit of candidates:  
“You get a completely mixed bag of skills and personalities.... It’s not good 
governance.” – Participant 5 
4.5. Selection Outcomes 
There were mixed selection outcomes recounted across the range of processes 
reported. The outcome of the selection was not specifically addressed during the 
interview and as such the outcome was not described for all selection experiences. 
As well, many selections were recent and the consequences of the selection still 
unknown during the data collection. Where participants did comment it was more 
likely to be due to a negative selection outcome. However some other participants 
also recounted positive experiences.  
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4.5.1. Positive outcomes 
Some participants expressed satisfaction with the selection outcome. 
In reference to their own selection from a traditional approach: 
  “I thoroughly enjoyed it.” – Participant 7   
In reference to another’s selection from a considered approach: 
“No regrets.” – Participant 6 
4.5.2. Negative outcomes 
On four occasions the participant recounted how a selection outcome had resulted 
in negative consequences for the board. Evidence of these four consequences are 
summarised in Table 4.7. The table shows that of the four described negative 
selection outcomes, three were the consequence of an externally managed 
selection and one from a traditional approach. These are the two selection 
approaches that limit or remove board involvement from the selection decision. 
These findings emphasise the value added through board involvement as a means 
to test for a candidate’s group fit, the absence of which can result in a misfit being 
appointed leading to disruption, reduced cooperation and process losses.   
Table 4.7 Evidence of Negative Outcomes & Corresponding Selection Approach 
Approach Excerpt 
Externally Managed “So for the first 6 months I just basically shut up, I 
wasn’t going to say anything. I needed to earn my 
stripes.”  
Externally Managed “This one director, no-one could get along with – he was 
problematic from the moment he walked in the room.” 
Externally Managed “The Chair really tested me, I felt like I was being 
scrutinised ... I was being tested.” 
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Traditional “Now that person came to the board and I couldn’t 
work with him. He was the most obnoxious character 
that I’ve ever come across in my life; had no knowledge 
of what the organisation did; had no connection to 
anything the organisation did. So I resigned.” 
 
4.6. Relationship between Selection Approach and Selection Outcome 
The variability in director selection approach described above in section 4.4 gives 
rise to an important additional research question: How does the selection approach 
impact the selection outcome? 
This question has arisen during the analysis process and therefore did not form an 
explicit focus during the data collection. However, the data collected suggested 
there were differences in the outcomes of different selection approaches worthy of 
further investigation. In line with the exploratory nature of this study another round 
of data analysis began with a focus on understanding which approach to director 
selection is best able to assess a candidate for role fit and group fit. 
Section 4.2 reported alignment in participant responses as to what they considered 
necessary criteria in director selections. Almost all responded that a candidate 
should meet the technical requirements in terms of complementary skills and 
experience, and candidates needed to be compatible with the incumbent board 
members in terms of values and characteristics. These criteria described by the 
participants matched the definitions of role fit and group fit from the human 
resource literature and therefore directors wanted candidates who were 
considered both a role fit and group fit.  
I now return to the human resource literature to consider how these two 
dimensions of ‘fit’ are best assessed in recruitment decisions. 
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4.6.1. Review of the literature on assessing ‘fit’ 
Candidate ‘fit’ is as a multi-dimensional construct (Kristof-Brown, 2000). Research 
in human resource decisions has shown recruitment selections based on multiple 
dimensions for fit, such as group fit and role fit, are more beneficial both to the 
candidate and to the organisation than where a single dimension is considered 
(Judge & Ferris, 1992; Kristof-Brown, 1996; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). 
Since each dimension of fit has a different focus, candidates are best assessed using 
multiple measures. Assessment of group fit relies on subjective assessments while 
role fit requires a more objective assessment of an individual’s skills and experience 
(Edwards & Shipp, 2007).  
Research has shown that in selection decisions a recruiter’s perception of the 
subjective forms of fit, such as group fit, receive greater weighting. Initial 
perceptions of similarity and compatibility can have a lasting effect on any 
subsequent evaluation, including candidate’s technical capabilities such as skills and 
knowledge (Zellmer-Bruhn, Maloney, Bhappu, & Salvador, 2008). This suggests the 
assessment of group fit is more useful if it is made after a candidate has been 
screened for the objective criteria around role fit (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990). 
Furthermore, assessing candidate’s technical abilities prior to meeting them may 
reduce bias by eliminating applicants who do not meet the role requirements. This 
reduces the likelihood of an individual being selected based on perceived group fit 
when they lack the necessary technical capability. 
Preconceived views of candidates have strong effects on overall evaluations even 
when later information disconfirms these initial opinions (Cable & Gilovich, 1998). 
For boards that recruit from a small closed network, knowing – or knowing of – a 
candidate may therefore bias the overall evaluation.  
While interviewing is effective in predicting compatibility, its effectiveness in 
predicting more objective measures such as technical skills and levels of experience 
has been questioned (Chatman, 1989; Judge & Ferris, 1992). In particular 
interviewer evaluations have been found to be influenced by appearance, non-
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verbal cues and similarity to the decision maker (Dipboye, 1992; Pingatore, Dugoni, 
Tindale, & Spring, 1994).  
Research has shown decision makers use their own value system as a benchmark 
for assessing candidates’ overall fit and that candidates selected are most likely to 
reflect the values of the decision maker (Adkins et al., 1994; Judge & Ferris, 1992). 
In board studies Westphal and Zajac (1995) found directors selected for new board 
positions are demographically similar to either the CEO or the incumbent directors 
depending on who had most influence over the selection decision. This suggests 
that where a single person dominates the selection there is a greater risk that the 
appointment will be made in self-interest. Selection decisions involving the wider 
board are more likely to achieve group fit (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 
2007). 
Assumptions drawn from the literature 
The literature described above leads to a number of assumptions d,etermining the 
best process to assess candidates for complementary technical capabilities (role fit) 
and group compatibility (group fit): 
1. Role fit and group fit are best assessed separately 
2. Group fit should be assessed after candidates have been screened for the 
more objective criteria in role fit 
3. Selections should involve multiple decision makers 
4. Group involvement increases the ability to assess group compatibility 
Figure 4.3 has built on these four assumptions to propose how well each of the four 
selection approaches described in section 4.4 may assess the two selection 
determinants of group fit and role fit.  A discussion of each selection approach 
follows in section 4.6.2. 
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Figure 4.3 Ability to Assess for Fit 
 
4.6.2. The ability to assess for ‘fit’ in director selections 
Traditional selection approach – ability to assess for fit 
Section 4.4 described the traditional selection approach as the least transparent 
and most informal of the approaches. This approach has been classified in Figure 
4.3 as moderate in its ability to assess both role fit and group fit.  
The moderate rating for role fit is a result of the dominance by a single person in 
the selection decision. The human resource literature discussed above suggests 
where a single person controls recruitment decisions they are more likely to show 
bias toward candidates who are similar to themselves. In turn this may result in a 
candidate appointment based on their personality rather that their ability to 
complement the board’s technical skills. This bias was also reflected in the 
interview data. A participant described a traditional selection where the Chair had 
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controlled the selection decision, suggesting the decision had been driven by 
personality rather than the candidate’s skills or experience.  
“It was much more around personality and ...as a board member I didn’t ever 
meet the guy until he turned up at the board and he was a nice guy...my 
perspective would be that his skills came secondary.” – Participant 5 
The above description of a traditional selection also highlights the lack of board 
involvement in these decisions, supporting a moderate rating of group fit. The lack 
of participation by the board in the selection decision increases the probability of 
an individual being selected who is incompatible with some or all of the incumbent 
board members. Traditional selections are therefore more likely to have the 
greatest variability in the selection outcomes. This is supported by the findings 
whereby participants reported both positive and negative outcomes from 
selections relying on this approach. 
Given the dominance of the Chair in selections under this approach, the appointed 
director is likely to resemble the Chair in background and demographic 
characteristics. Repeated, this process may lead to board homogeneity decreasing 
diversity. The dominance of a single person over the selection decision increases 
the chance that ingratiatory behaviour may influence the decision as well as 
increase the risk that a newly appointed director feels obligated to the Chair for 
appointing them, resulting in decreased challenge and opposing viewpoints. 
Socialised selection approach – ability to assess for fit  
Figure 4.3 suggests a socialised approach to selection facilitates the ability for a 
board to assess candidates for group fit (strong rating) but may not always provide 
for candidates to meet the technical role requirements (moderate rating). The 
reliance on closed networks means candidates are already known to some or all 
board members. As such the selection decision may be made based on the 
candidate’s reputation or simply because they are known and trusted. While this 
increases the likelihood that a director will be a good group fit, without a rigorous 
assessment of role fit the selected director may lack the required technical 
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capabilities. This was highlighted in the interviews by one participant’s comments 
of a socialised selection approach. In particular they pointed out that selecting 
people known through existing networks wouldn’t always result in the best 
candidate being appointed. 
“They’re using the old network or they’re doing that sort of find me some 
people and I’ll see what I think of them...You know well that doesn’t 
necessarily get you the right people.” – Participant 6 
Similar to the traditional approach, the reliance on closed networks for socialised 
selections is also likely to increase board homogeneity and reduce diversity. 
Considered selection approach – ability to assess for fit   
Appointments made under a considered approach are most aligned to both the 
best practices described in the human resource literature. This approach is also 
aligned to the ASX corporate governance guidelines for director selection that 
suggests selections should include an open search for candidates who meet the 
needs of the board and an involvement by all board members in the selection 
decision (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). As a consequence, Figure 4.3 
suggests this approach provides the strongest ability to assess candidates for both 
role fit and group fit. 
The considered approach to director selection separates assessment of technical 
skills from assessment of group fit. Skills are typically assessed prior to meeting 
candidates thereby reducing the likelihood of perceptions of similarity and group fit 
overriding role fit. The use of open networks to search for candidates results in a 
greater chance that the candidate will meet the identified technical abilities.  
The two-stage approach to considered selections is explained through a 
participant’s recollection below. The excerpt highlights that the first stage is 
concerned with assessing candidate’s role fit (hard skills) and the second stage tests 
for group fit. The involvement by the wider board in the decision is also noted, as is 
the aim of this approach, which is to find a balance of the right technical skills and 
the right personality fit: 
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“It’s very much on hard skills initially and then when we met them, personality 
wise it was a really big issue … you’d be able to come back and say I just don’t 
think they’re going to fit but that hasn’t been the primary driver.” – 
Participant 5 
However it should be noted that the pool for directors remains small, especially 
within larger corporation networks. Consequently even where candidates are found 
through open sources, such as recruitment firms, they still may be known to the 
Chair and incumbent board members. This idea was reflected in the interview data: 
“I think if you were to talk to head-hunters that were honest with you they 
would say that when it gets down to it the person that knows somebody on 
the board has more chance of being appointed.” – Participant 4 
Externally managed selection approach – ability to assess for fit  
The interview data suggested appointments made using an external approach have 
a strong emphasis on skills or role fit and it is almost certain that selections made 
under this approach will meet the technical demands of the board. However, by 
failing to include the wider board – including the Chair – in the selection decision 
there is no ability to assess compatibility of the candidate. Despite a strong ability 
to test for role fit, selections under this approach have the weakest ability to test 
for group fit. As a result there is a greater probability for selections made under this 
approach to result in a mis-fit from a group perspective. This is supported by the 
results from section 4.5 that reported most instances of negative outcomes are a 
result of an externally managed approach to director selection.  
This is also confirmed through the interview data with participants expressing their 
thoughts on an externally managed selection:  
“They look for a mix of people and they put them on the board without the 
consideration of who is the existing Chair or the like...you can’t do any due 
diligence and therefore you can get somebody who can be really disruptive to 
the board. It was just a bizarre process.” – Participant 4 
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4.7. Summary of Findings 
Section 4.2 reported a high convergence in participant responses suggesting 
candidate ‘fit’ was a critical criterion for director selections. The notion of ‘fit’ was 
further classified as a group fit  – a supplementary fit based on compatibility and 
value congruence, and a role fit – a complementary fit based on the board’s 
technical resource needs. It was further ascertained that for successful board 
appointments directors considered both dimensions of fit as necessary criteria in 
candidates. 
Section 4.3 reported a high level of variability in approaches taken to selecting new 
directors with the greatest difference found in the source for identifying candidates 
– open or closed networks – and the level of the board participation in the selection 
decision, ranging from all of the board to no participation at all.  
Section 4.4 applied these two significant variances in director selection approach to 
categorise four common selection approaches. A traditional selection approach, 
informal and non-transparent; a socialised selection approach heavily reliant on the 
boards’ social networks; a considered selection approach, open and transparent; 
and an externally managed approach that removes the selection decision from the 
board.  
Section 4.5 described the selection outcomes that are described by the participants. 
In particular it highlights a pattern between the lack of board involvement and the 
reporting of negative consequences on board dynamics.  
Section 4.6 considered an additional research question arising from the data 
analysis: how does the approach to selection impact the selection outcome? This 
was addressed by considering the ability for each of the four selection approaches 
(section 4.4) to assess for role fit and group fit in candidates. The results of this 
suggest that only the considered approach to selection has a strong ability to assess 
for both role fit and group fit and as such is most likely to deliver a positive 
selection outcome. In contrast the traditional and externally managed approaches 
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are weakest in their ability to assess for group fit and are more likely to result in a 
negative selection outcome.  
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
5.1. Introduction to Discussion  
In this final chapter the key findings from Chapter 4 are presented along with the 
contributions of this study. This is accompanied by a discussion on identified 
limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. 
5.2. Key Findings 
Director selection is a critical but undeveloped area of the corporate governance 
literature (Withers et al., 2012), creating a gap in our understanding of how boards 
can be more effective. This research has set out to address this limitation by gaining 
a greater understanding of how and why directors are selected.  
A qualitative study was designed to explore the perceptions and experiences of 
current non-executive directors who have been involved in a director selection. The 
results of these in-depth interviews provide fresh insights into the determinants 
and processes for director selection. Collectively these insights describe a 
relationship between the selection approach and selection outcome that has 
implications for future research into board group dynamics. The key highlights from 
the findings are detailed below. 
5.2.1. A convergence in criteria but a divergence in approach 
Overwhelmingly participants indicated they sought candidates with technical skills 
and experience that would balance the needs and requirements of the board. 
Participants also expressed a wish for candidates to be compatible with incumbent 
board members to facilitate board cohesion. Therefore participants expressed that 
there were two distinct criteria for director selections. Descriptions of each 
selection criteria matched the commonly used definitions of ‘role fit’ and ‘group fit’ 
from the human resource literature (Kristof-Brown, 2000) and as such have been 
adopted by this study.  
The alignment in responses indicating both role fit and group fit are important 
determinants of director selection was common across the range of participants 
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representing organisations from public, government and non-profit sectors and 
ranging in size from small (less than $5 million annual revenue) to large (more than 
$1billion annual revenue) and across a number of industry settings. This suggests 
that regardless of an organisation’s sector or size, boards seek out new directors 
using similar criteria. 
Despite similarities in the selection criteria the findings demonstrated considerable 
variability in selection approach, or how new directors are selected. Two significant 
variances emerged: whether the source for identifying candidates came from an 
open or closed network and the involvement of the board in the selection decision. 
A closed network describes instances where candidates have existing relationships 
with the Chair, CEO or incumbent board members (section 4.3.1.1). Open networks 
refer to broader search strategies that include external advertising and the use of 
recruitment consultants (section 4.3.1.2). The level of board participation varied 
from no involvement, minimal involvement by a single decision maker (most often 
the Chair), to high involvement including a nomination committee and all of the 
board (section 4.3.2). 
These two variable aspects of the selection approach (source for identification and 
level of board participation) were applied to a matrix resulting in four common 
approaches to director selection being identified. These approaches were 
categorised as traditional, socialised, considered and externally managed. Each 
approach is described in detail in section 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
While some patterns emerged between the type of selection approach adopted 
and a type of organisation there were no conclusive linkages. For example, most 
government appointments were externally managed but not all, while 
appointments made in the non-profit sector varied from traditional, socialised and 
considered. Rather, the data suggests that the choice of approach may be driven by 
two independent factors, the level of public accountability faced by the board for 
the selection decision and the relative power of the board in the selection decision. 
The influence of each is discussed below and illustrated in figure 5.2. 
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Public accountability 
The findings from this study suggest that the level of public accountability a board 
faces with regard to director selection decisions has a strong influence on the 
selection criteria and as a result on the process for identifying candidates.  
Chapter 2 discussed the corporate governance reform that took place early in the 
21st century and the pursuant increase in public expectations of boards. As a result, 
companies with a high public profile are providing more information than before on 
their practices and policies, including the selection of new directors.  
In Australia the ASX Corporate Governance Council have voluntary guidelines for 
corporations publicly listed on the Australian stock exchange. They suggest “the 
board should comprise directors possessing an appropriate range of skills and 
expertise” and also that, “*a+n evaluation of the range of skills, experience and 
expertise on the board is important when considering new candidates” (p. 19). 
Furthermore, the guidelines encourage disclosure of board selections including “the 
processes which the boards adopt in searching and selecting new directors to the 
board” (p. 18).  
These guidelines have two likely impacts on director selection for Australian 
publicly listed corporations. Firstly, they place a greater emphasis on matching 
candidate technical skills with those identified as needed for the board to 
effectively govern. Secondly, they encourage a move to broader and more open 
search strategy to identify and then assess candidates against the specified 
technical criteria. The findings from this study support these two outcomes. The 
experiences recounted of director selections for publicly listed companies confirm a 
strong emphasis on the role fit of candidates, and a shift to more formal search 
practices including the use of open networks and external recruitment firms for 
identifying and screening candidates.  
Public accountability is high for government boards within Australia and 
consequently these boards seek to demonstrate impartiality. Public sector 
organisations range in structure and cover varying levels of government. As such 
there is no overarching set of corporate governance guidelines in the government 
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sector though there has been a noted increase in disclosure of corporate 
governance practices in annual reports, in particular in the larger government 
owned corporations (Ryan & Ng, 2000).  
Public sector boards face high levels of accountability to their governing authority. 
Additionally there is a strong emphasis on gender diversity within government 
organisations, with a stated target of more than 40% women on Australian 
government boards by 2015. It is unsurprising then that selections from 
government boards in this study also reported a strong emphasis on the role fit of 
directors as a justifiable reason for the appointment of a director. 
Relative power of the board in the selection decision 
Past research that has found that the relative balance of power between the CEO 
and the board will influence the type of person selected for board positions 
(Westphal & Stern, 1995). Similarly, this study has found that the degree of power 
the board has over the selection decision can influence the extent to which group 
fit is assessed.  
Whilst the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines suggest that the entire board 
should be responsible for the selection decision, the results of this study suggest 
this is not always the case. The director selection experiences described for this 
study have highlighted variability in who makes the selection decision. While many 
selections did involve the whole board, in a number of other instances the selection 
decision was dominated by the Chair (section 4.3.2). At the other extreme the 
entire board, including the Chair, were excluded from the process and therefore 
had no direct influence over who was selected (section 4.3.2). Almost unanimously 
participants considered group dynamics an important selection criteria and one 
that should be assessed as part of the selection process. This suggests that where 
the board has influence over the selection decision, group fit will be assessed. 
Conversely, where the board has no power over the selection decision, group fit 
will be ignored. 
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5.2.2. Selection approach and the ability to assess for fit 
The variability found in director selection approach raised an important subsequent 
question: how does the selection approach impact a board’s ability to meet the 
selection criteria of role fit and group fit? To address this third research question, a 
further iteration of analysis was undertaken between the human resource 
management literature and the data. Best practices were drawn from the literature 
to assess each of the four director selection approaches. As a result, patterns 
emerged suggesting that the chosen selection approach influences the board’s 
ability to assess a candidate against the selection criteria of role fit and group fit. 
These are illustrated in figure 4.3 and described in section 4.6.  
The emergent patterns indicate that where boards use broad open sources to 
identify candidates, they are better equipped to assess a candidate for their ability 
to meet the board’s technical requirements (role fit). Equally, where all of the board 
is involved in the selection decision the board as a whole is better able to assess a 
candidate’s group fit. The most optimal approach to selection in terms of meeting 
the selection criteria is therefore one that incorporates open sources for identifying 
candidates and board participation in the selection decision.  
5.2.3. The impact of the director selection approach on board functioning 
Collectively the findings from the three research questions provide insight into the 
how and why directors are selected. They also indicate a relationship between the 
selection approach and the selection outcome. Whilst the focus of this study has 
been on director selection, the findings indicate implications for future studies into 
board effectiveness. 
A common theme throughout this study has been the importance of board social 
cohesion for an effective board. Group fit is an antecedent to board cohesion 
(Seong et al., 2012). Consequently the ability to assess group fit in director 
selections is likely to be an important enabler for board effectiveness. The findings 
show that not all selection approaches allow for assessment of group fit. Where the 
board lacks influence over the selection decision there is minimal or no 
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participation by the existing board in the selection decision. As a result there is 
limited ability for a board to determine how well a candidate will get along with the 
existing board, increasing the probability of a selection resulting in a misfit.  
Figure 5.1 combines the results from chapter 4 with the literature from small group 
behaviour (discussed in section 2.2.3) to suggest a relationship between the 
selection criteria, the selection approach and resulting impact on board group 
dynamics. 
Figure 5.1 Director Selection and Impact on Board Group Dynamics 
 
 
Selection criteria -> selection approach 
The findings from chapter 4 highlight two main criteria in director selection, role fit 
and group fit. Section 5.2.1 above suggests two factors may influence the 
importance of each of these criteria in candidate selections, public accountability 
and the relative power of the board. The orange arrows in figure 5.1 therefore 
indicate a positive influence between the influence of public accountability, the 
criteria of role fit and a broad, open approach to sourcing candidates. This 
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relationship proposes boards that are more accountable for their selection focus on 
role fit as a key justification for the selection and as such skills become integral to 
the selection process.  
Similarly, figure 5.1 depicts a positive influence between the relative power of the 
board and the criteria of group fit along with wide involvement of the board in the 
selection decision. For boards where there is strong Chair or CEO power, there is a 
lesser need to include the views of the remaining board members and as such a 
lesser scope for board members to be included in the process.  
The blue and red arrows in figure 5.1 are used to indicate where the required 
conditions for assessing role fit and group fit are present or absent in each of four 
selection approaches (as discussed and categorised in section 4.4). A broad open 
search for candidates is present in an externally managed and considered approach 
to selection. These conditions are absent in a socialised and traditional approach. 
Similarly, wide board involvement is present in a considered or socialised approach 
but absent in an externally managed or traditional approach. 
Selection approach -> impact on board dynamics 
Participants described a number of negative experiences from director selections 
that did not involve group participation in the selection decision. The participants 
described instances of process losses, “so for the first 6 months I just basically shut 
up, I wasn’t going to say anything” and disruption, “this one director, no-one could 
get along with”. In another instance the appointment of one director resulted in 
the resignation of another. Further details of participant negative experiences are 
illustrated in table 4.7 and described in section 4.5. The large yellow arrow in figure 
5.1 therefore suggests that where there is an absence of board involvement, such 
as under the externally managed and traditional selection approach, there is a 
higher probability of board dysfunction than in a considered or socialised approach, 
where board involvement is present.  
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5.3. Contributions  
This study has added a new perspective to director selection, an area of corporate 
governance that has received little attention in the literature. By gaining a greater 
level of understanding as to how and why directors are selected, this research has 
suggested a new relationship between the selection approach and selection 
outcome that has the potential to impact the dynamics of the board. As such the 
findings have implications for both theory and practice. 
5.3.1. Contributions to Theory 
Greater understanding of director selection  
There have been few examinations of director selection (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995) 
and those often relied on are typically outdated (for example, Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Mace, 1971). Another limitation to the current literature on director selection 
is the tendency by scholars to focus on a single aspect only. For example, some 
have focused on the influence of relationships and power in director selections (Kim 
& Cannella, 2008; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal & Stern, 2007). Others have 
considered more traditional influences, considering the skills, knowledge and 
experiences that lead to director appointments (Fich, 2005; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Hillman, 2005). The results presented in Chapter 4 support both of these 
perspectives. A director’s selection is likely to be influenced by a candidate’s skills 
and experience as well as relationships and perceived compatibility with the 
incumbent board members. Rather than compete, these two criteria complement 
each other. The results indicate both role fit and group fit are likely to influence the 
selection decision. By consolidating the two perspectives found in the literature, 
this study has addressed the need for a more holistic view of director selection 
(Withers et al, 2012), presenting a more complete and current description of how 
and why directors are selected. 
Further consideration of the theoretical implications for role fit and group fit as 
selection criteria are discussed below. 
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Role fit  
There is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding who makes a good director 
(Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2012). Many individual attributes of directors such as 
independence, functional background and diversity have been studied in relation to 
board performance (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). The results from this study suggest that individual attributes considered 
important in director selections are not uniform across boards; rather they are 
complementary to the existing board and therefore dependent on the current 
board composition. A number of factors have been cited in the literature as 
influencing the type of person a board seeks in selections, including organisational 
performance, strategy and life cycle (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992). This study found that the type of skills, experience and abilities sought 
by boards when recruiting also depends on the current board competencies.  
Group fit  
While the literature has suggested relationships are an important determinant in 
director selection, it has spent less time considering why. The findings from this 
study support a common theme in the literature, that existing relationships do 
influence director selections. Furthermore it adds to our understanding by 
suggesting a driver behind the strong reliance on closed networks is the desire to 
select an individual who is liked and trusted by the incumbent board members. 
Evidence of the benefits from group cohesion are common in the small groups 
literature but are less explored within corporate governance. This study has shown 
that group fit in the form of compatibility is an important determinant to director 
selections. This is a departure from traditional agency theory research that 
emphasises director independence. While independence typically refers to the 
relationship between management and directors, less research has considered 
independence within the boardroom. This study has shown that an over emphasis 
on independence and director technical skills, without due consideration for group 
fit, can lead to negative outcomes for board functioning. For example, where the 
decision on selection is removed from the board there is a greater risk of board 
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dysfunction than where the selected director is known to the incumbent board (and 
therefore of less independence). 
A number of scholars have suggested that board research needs to move away 
from the dominant agency theory (Daily et al., 2003; Finklestein & Mooney, 2003) 
and needs to consider theories and perspectives from other disciplines (Huse et al., 
2011). This study of director selection practices addresses these calls by 
incorporating knowledge from the small groups, organisational behaviour and the 
human resource literature into the study. In doing so it provides a broadened 
perspective of board composition and the director selection decision that precedes 
it.  
Expanding the behavioural based research agenda 
This research has been motivated by a call for more research into board behaviour 
and board processes in order to understand what boards actually do (Pettigrew, 
1992, 1997; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). Access difficulties are often cited as a 
restriction to behavioural process data (Daily et al., 2003). This study has followed 
others (for example, Bezemer, Nicholson, & Pugliese, 2013; Brundin & Nordqvist, 
2008; Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Maitlis, 2004; Parker, 2007) in opening the black 
box by providing first-hand empirical evidence of director selections. 
Chapter 2 highlighted inconclusive results from numerous studies examining the 
relationship between board composition and board effectiveness (Adams et al., 
2010; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991, 2003). Board composition studies typically 
consider individual characteristics of directors and fail to take into account the 
intervening effect of group dynamics. Pettigrew (1992) suggested “[t]he multitude 
of endogenous and exogenous factors that influence company performance make 
the assumed effect of board demographic characteristics on board performance 
very difficult to establish” (p. 170). This explains a problem past studies have 
encountered, focusing on individual level director characteristics to explain board 
effectiveness - a group level construct.  
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The findings from this study support the idea that board dynamics have an impact 
on board effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005, 2007; Minichilli et al., 
2012). And while measuring board performance was not within the scope of this 
study, the findings suggest that the approach adopted for director selection may 
affect the performance of the new board configuration.  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship most often studied in the board composition 
research. It highlights the problem of drawing on individual level director 
characteristics to explain board effectiveness at a group level. Further it suggests 
that group fit is an important factor in this relationship and should therefore be 
included in future board composition studies.  
Figure 5.2 Relationship between Board Composition and Board Effectiveness 
 
Empirical evidence across organisational settings 
A third theoretical contribution from this study is the inclusion of a comparison 
across organisation settings. Sample data in past corporate governance studies has 
lacked organisational diversity, most often comprising of firms of a similar size and 
industry focus. An objective of this research has been to seek out differences and 
similarities between the director selection practices of organisations from differing 
size, industry and sectors. This form of empirical comparison is rare in the corporate 
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governance literature (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) that predominately focuses on a 
single organisational setting and most frequently large corporate boards. 
Differences between boards in different organisational settings have been 
acknowledged (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). These results show that there are also 
similarities between different boards in different settings in terms of the attributes 
and characteristics they look for when selecting new directors. However, their 
ability to meet these criteria may be limited by how attractive they are  to potential 
candidates.   
5.3.2. Contributions to practice 
Historically boards have been criticised for cronyism and homogeneity stemming 
from a practice of appointing directors from a small and elite network. More 
recently the implementation of the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines along 
with increased public expectations has created a shift in Australian board selection 
practices to one that is more formal and transparent. Limited current information 
exists to detail the extent to which these external pressures have shifted director 
selection practices. This research provides a timely and relevant view of the director 
selection approach adopted by Australian organisations and as such has a number 
of implications for corporate governance practice.  
Selection approach impacts selection outcome 
This study offers a new understanding of how the selection approach may impact 
the selection outcomes in terms of achieving a desired role fit and group fit. For 
practitioners this is significant as it suggests a more considered approach to 
selection involving a wide search for candidates and board participation in the 
selection decision increases the probability of board harmony, an important factor 
in board performance. In contrast, where boards consider alternative, less 
considered approaches to selection such as relying on internal networks or the 
involvement of a single decision maker only, they face a greater risk of appointing a 
misfit. 
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This study highlights the importance of including all of the board in the selection 
decision, which is in line with the ASX corporate governance guidelines. The results 
also indicated that in practice a number of boards – most notably from the 
government sector - manage the selection of new directors externally and 
therefore ignore the input from existing board members. The results show that this 
practice increases the probability of board dysfunction with a potential to lead to 
board process losses. The difficulties faced in removing a problematic director also 
means that an unsuccessful selection is not easily rectified.  
A shift in selection practices, informal practices continue 
The findings from this study suggest that in general organisations are shifting 
toward a more considered and transparent director section process. The results 
show this move is not just evident in organisations with high public accountability 
but also in smaller organisations including those from the non-profit sector that do 
not face the same level of public scrutiny. Furthermore this shift is well received by 
directors who consider processes that incorporate a wider and more open search to 
be both ‘bona-fide’ and ‘pleasing’. 
The study also notes however that not all boards have moved to formal selection 
practices and informal and ad hoc appointments to boards do continue. The 
motivation for recruiting from small closed networks may be driven less by self-
interest and more by getting the right people on the board to maintain group 
harmony. In other cases, in particular smaller non-profits, informal recruiting 
practices may be due to a perceived supply shortage of willing and capable 
directors to volunteer (section 4.3.1.1). These boards would benefit from an 
awareness that recruitment practices reliant on the same closed networks may lead 
to board homogeneity and lack of diversity, potentially resulting in group problems 
including groupthink. 
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A need to balance role fit and group fit  
This study suggests that both board dynamics and technical needs are important 
criteria for director selections and that the best selection outcome will come from a 
process that allows a balance for both.  
The past dominance of agency theory has emphasised the control role for directors 
promoting independence and expertise as critical selection criteria. While this study 
does not contradict this assertion, it does suggest that without consideration for 
how a new board member will interact and work with the existing board, a 
selection based purely on technical abilities may inadvertently prove unsuccessful 
due to the number of group problems that can arise when cohesion and trust are 
absent.  
Furthermore the need for skills and experience by candidates has been described as 
complementary, that is boards look for candidates who can fill a gap in current 
board capabilities. This suggests that a skill assessment is an important preliminary 
step in director selection. Before recruiting new directors boards should first 
understand the skills and knowledge present on the board and assess this against 
that which is needed to effectively govern.  
5.4. Limitations 
5.4.1. Methodology 
There is limited recent research addressing director selections in the corporate 
governance literature. It is also recognised that research into boards generally is 
limited by its reliance on secondary data that fails to capture and examine board 
processes and board behaviour. In order to address these existing limitations this 
study adopted an exploratory approach using qualitative interviews. The rationale 
for this approach was to develop a greater and more nuanced understanding of the 
director selection decision by exploring the experiences and perspectives of those 
who have participated in the phenomenon. A consequence of adopting this 
qualitative mode of enquiry was certain limitations. In particular these relate to the 
sample size, the data collection and subjective nature of interviews.   
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Sample  
The objective of the sample strategy was not generalisability but rather to allow for 
depth and breadth of information. This was achieved through a diverse sample that 
represented directors from three organisational sectors, small through to very large 
in size and a diverse range of gender and age groups. The data sample of 10 
participants yielded a sample of 24 different director selection occasions. This 
enabled the research questions to be adequately addressed and saturation to be 
reached. However this is a relatively small sample number compared to many other 
qualitative studies and while it enabled the research questions to be addressed 
adequately a larger sample size may have provided greater comparison and 
confirmation. Additionally, this study aimed to include a diversity of views by 
including Chairs and non- executive directors. However no CEOs or executive 
directors were included in the sample. Future research may benefit from also 
understanding how their experiences and perceptions of the selection approach 
differ from those included in this study. 
A further limitation to the sample may be a bias in results related to organisational 
sector. Twenty-four selection approaches that were described by participants 
during the data collection formed the basis of this study. Of the 24 processes the 
majority (13) described selections in the non-profit sector. The least (four) 
described selections for publicly listed company boards. This skew in sample may 
have an impact on the results due to the difference in candidate supply. On 
multiple occasions directors from the non-profit sector communicated a perceived 
supply problem stemming from a belief that there exists a shortage of high calibre 
directors willing to volunteer (all non-profit boards described in this study are 
voluntary positions). This perception may alter the approach and willingness to 
trade-off between role fit and group fit in candidates. In contrast the larger publicly 
listed boards included in this study are likely to have a high supply of candidates for 
any position and as a result can take a more rigorous approach to selection.  
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Saturation 
The point of theoretical saturation has been described in section 3.5.3. This was the 
point at which no new insights were revealed from analysing the data and the 
researcher felt the information had been exhausted and the coding process was 
complete. However as there was only a single data point there was limited ability to 
confirm emergent themes. There was also inadequate information to check for 
falsifying evidence that would refute the emergent themes. This could have been 
improved by returning to all or a selection of the participants to test the theories 
and search for negative cases. 
Data collection 
Ten interviews were conducted for this study with each lasting 33 to 58 minutes. 
This study may have been limited by the depth of understanding that could be 
reached within this timeframe, impacting the extent of insight that could be drawn 
from participant experiences. It was also difficult to thoroughly verify participant’s 
responses within this timeframe. The study may have benefited from a second 
round of interviews that would offer an opportunity to further explore emergent 
themes and to verify the researcher’s understanding of experiences as described by 
the participant.  
Subjective nature of interviews 
This study has adopted a subjectivist approach, which is appropriate for the study’s 
aims to gain insight into participant’s experiences of director selection.  While this 
was the more appropriate approach for the objectives of this study, a subjectivist 
approach presents particular challenges to establishing trustworthiness in the 
findings due to the risk of researcher bias in the studies interpretations. Interviews 
provide data based on participant’s experiences and perspectives – rather than 
what actually occurred (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Taylor, 2005). It is therefore 
difficult in most circumstances for the researcher to verify these and to isolate bias 
in the responses.  
Participant perspective 
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This data used in this study was derived from recounted participant experiences of 
director selection. These experiences were drawn from instances where the 
participant was a member of a board recruiting a new director, and also where the 
participant was a candidate for board member selection. The participants’ 
perspective of the selection is likely to differ depending on their position (as 
candidate or recruiting board member). While this difference was indicated and 
recorded in the data coding and analysis process, differences in perspectives were 
not thoroughly explored or reported in the findings.  
5.4.2. Time consideration 
This study adopted a cross-sectional research design that by its nature limits the 
ability to understand the dynamic aspect of boards (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). 
While the findings from this study reflect the experiences and perceptions of 
participants at a particular point in time, it has been unable to take account of how 
board dynamics grow and develop over time (Gersick, 1988, 1989). 
A longitudinal study would have captured the changing dynamics of boards as a 
decision-making group indicating whether there was a longer term effect of a board 
selection and how the outcome of a selection matches up with the expectation. 
5.4.3. Context 
Further research may be required before the findings from this research can be 
transferred into different cultural settings. This study has been set within a context 
of Australian organisations and therefore its transferability may be limited to 
countries that share a similar cultural and corporate governance environment. Kim 
and Cannella (2008) noted that organisations in emerging countries such as China, 
Indonesia and Thailand are likely to have different director selection influences. In 
these countries where the majority of companies are family owned the owners 
have a greater influence on who is selected than in countries such as Australia 
where public shareholders have a greater interest in more prominent companies.   
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5.5. Future Research 
This study suggests that there is a lot to be learned from studying director selection 
in more depth. Director selection has lacked attention in the past and consequently 
the corporate governance literature fails to provide a comprehensive view of how 
and why directors are selected.  The findings of this study have made some 
advances into this area by presenting a holistic view of director selection that 
suggests a balanced approach taking into account both technical skills and board 
dynamics is likely to lead to improved board performance. While advancing the 
overall knowledge of director selection literature there are a number of limitations 
to this study. These were addressed above in section 5.4. As an emerging area of 
research, there remains a lot to be gained from investigating the director selection 
in more depth. To follow are a number of opportunities for future research that 
build on the findings of this study. 
5.5.1. Consideration of changes over time 
While this research was designed as a cross-sectional study, a future longer-term 
study may enable a richer understanding of how board dynamics change over time 
(Machold & Farquhar, 2013). Future research by means of a longitudinal study 
would therefore be well positioned to build on the findings of this study and 
consider critical questions such as do the perceived benefits from selecting an 
individual come to fruition? For example, if an individual is selected for their 
experience in a particular area, is that expertise fully utilised by the board – and if 
not what is preventing this contribution? A related research question that could be 
addressed through a future longitudinal study is how long does it take new 
members to integrate and therefore be in a position to be able to contribute 
effectively? 
5.5.2. Broadened research into the director selection and group dynamics 
Relative importance of role fit versus group fit 
The discussion section of this study has suggested that the most optimal selection 
outcome is a result of a selection approach that can adequately assess both the role 
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fit and group fit of a candidate. Furthermore it has suggested that the inability to 
assess either group fit or role fit may lead to group problems effecting overall board 
effectiveness. This area would benefit from further research to test these 
assumptions and consider which group problems are more likely to arise from 
which selection approach. It would also be interesting to understand the relative 
importance of group fit and role fit on board performance and whether an inability 
to assess candidates for group fit had a larger or smaller impact on board 
performance compared to the inability to assess role fit.  
Why directors are not selected 
Research into director selection typically focuses on the determinants of director 
selection by considering the factors and influences that lead to an individual’s 
successful appointment. Few studies have questioned why individuals are not 
selected, that is what makes an individual ‘unattractive’ for selection? A greater 
understanding in this area would contribute by offering a counter perspective to 
the factors that are understood to positively influence selection, for example 
interpersonal relationships, reputation and impression management.   
Board Dynamics 
Board dynamics has been identified by numerous studies as an important 
contributor to board performance. Given this focus it would be beneficial to gain a 
greater understanding of what factors contribute to or detract from group fit within 
a board context? For example, what impact does diversity or independence have on 
board dynamics?  
Related to this, a further area for study would be examining why do directors leave 
boards? An understanding of the conditions and influences that prompt a director 
to exit a board would provide a counter perspective to the factors contributing to a 
cohesive board and in doing so advance the board dynamics research agenda. 
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Diversity 
Diversity, in particular the representation of women and minority groups, has 
become a focus in a number of board performance studies. Fewer have considered 
diversity from a director selection and group dynamic perspective. Future research 
would benefit from understanding what happens to the board dynamics when 
women join a board? How do women influence levels of board cohesion, open 
discussion and group interaction? Related studies could consider the same 
questions in relation to minority groups and other areas of demographical diversity 
such as age. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In the well-loved children’s tale Goldilocks is presented with three options. The first 
is too hot and too soft; the second too cold, too hard and too big. It is only the third 
option that falls somewhere between the other two that is ‘just right’.  
The results from this study have shown that the approach taken for director 
selections can be too rigorous and too distanced from the boards’ social needs. 
Alternatively they can be too informal and too reliant on social networks. Evidence 
from past research combined with the findings from this study suggest that 
although there are numerous approaches, the one that provides a balanced 
assessment of both role fit and group fit is likely to result in an outcome for the 
board that is ‘just right’. 
It is well recognised that boards require a high degree of skill and knowledge. This 
study has highlighted the need for boards to also be able to function effectively as a 
group. As such, director selections need to take account of both of these 
requirements when selecting new members.   
Director selection is a fundamental input into board performance. It is during the 
director selection process that prospective new members are assessed for their 
ability to contribute needed technical skills as well as assessed for their ability to 
work well with the incumbent board. A successful director selection is one that 
incorporates an approach to balance both of these criteria. By casting a broad 
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search for candidates and involving the entire board in the selection decision, 
boards are best able to appoint a candidate who is not only equipped with the right 
technical skills but also functions well enough within the board environment to 
ensure that their skills are used to make an effective contribution. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Director Selection Interviews – Guide 
A. Introduction – about me and about the research.  
B. Interviewee background  
a. What is your experience on boards? First, current?  
C. Formal Questions: 
1. Is your board currently looking for a director? / Recently selected a director?  
a. What were the selection criteria? 
b. What type of personal characteristics did you look for? 
 
2. If you had 2 candidates that looked the same on paper (i.e. skills, 
qualifications & required experience) – what would lead you to choose one 
over the other? (Specific to xx board) 
 
3. How do you test for these (personal traits as mentioned above)? 
 
 
4. Who sets the criteria / who makes the selection decision? 
 
 
5. Think back to your prior / other positions on other boards – Would the 
selection criteria have been the same? 
 
6. Do you think director selection requirements are the same across sectors 
and industry? – How may they differ? 
 
D. Close out: 
Is there anything else you think might be important regarding the topics we’ve 
discussed or generally around the director selection criteria? 
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Appendix 2 Director Selection Interviews – Checklist 
 
o Ethics Form signed 
 
 
o Audio recording permission (sign & verbal) 
 
o Feedback to participants 
Do participants want feedback from this study results? 
 
o Follow up 
Is participant happy to participate in any follow up questions (by phone)? 
 
o Recommendations  
Can the candidate introduce other participants? 
 
o Post Interview Thank you email 
 
o Admin File 
o Field notes 
o Reflection notes 
o Transcribed notes 
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Appendix 3 Code Book 
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Appendix 4 Examples of Coded Note Card 
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Appendix 5 Contact Summary Sheet: Participant Information 
Name (deleted for confidentiality) 
Date & location of 
interview 
 
20/8 Teneriffe 
Gender  
Male 
Age Group  35 
Position  Chair 
Company  (deleted for confidentiality) 
Company Size $2m revenue: Small 
Tenure 2.5 years 
Other current directorships None 
Past directorships None 
Time in directorships 2.5 years 
Current board size & 
diversity mix 
5 Female, 1 Male 
Other  Recently completed AICD directors course 
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Appendix 6 Contact Summary Sheet: Post Interview Reflection 
 
Participant:   (deleted for confidentiality)   Date: 20/8 
 
Reflections on Process: 
Known participant – felt more comfortable probing, flowing conversation 
Young, less experienced – provides a different perspective but less depth at times. 
 
Reflections on Content & Themes: 
1. Hard skills – finance is key, the rest can be outsourced 
2. Fit – depends on team dynamics & the phase of the board, currently in a 
‘build-phase’:  
3. Soft skills – Need someone who can get the best out of the CEO, need to suit 
the organisational feel 
4. Genuine interest in NFP sector – but not too passionate. Need to avoid the 
“mum’s club” 
5. Availability + commitment are important 
 
Other notes: 
NFP Focus – no comparison to other sectors, just hypothetical 
Follow up actions: 
None. 
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Appendix 7 Participant Information 
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